By focusing on the emergence of an Islamist elite in Algeria, this paper identifies the conditions under which co-optation processes stabilize authoritarian regimes. It first provides an empirical assessment on...
By focusing on the emergence of an Islamist elite in Algeria, this paper identifies the conditions under which co-optation processes stabilize authoritarian regimes. It first provides an empirical assessment on the presence of MSP-Hamas elite in state institutions, which reveals that their co-optation is symbolic in terms of power sharing. This in turn brings about the question of what were the expectations of the actors involved in the co-optation process. While MSP-Hamas leaders expected to strengthen their party in order to take over power, it appears that they failed in their attempts to gain more influence in the decision-making process. The analysis presented here shows that it is the very conditions under which this elite was co-opted that precluded it to undermine the authoritarian incumbents' hold on power.
