

THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION PUBLIC OPINION OVER TIME



August 2025

INTRODUCTION

Public attitudes among Palestinians and Israelis toward the two-state solution have fluctuated over time, though generally not in extreme ways. While it has consistently remained the most preferred option among alternatives, there has been a clear trend of declining support. This decline is largely attributed to a growing belief that the two-state solution is no longer feasible – a sentiment reflected in numerous relevant surveys and mostly associated with the continuous construction and expansion of Israeli settlements.

Several regular polls are conducted separately in Palestine and Israel, with a few surveying both populations jointly. This review focuses on those polls that somewhat regularly examine public opinion on the two-state solution. On the Palestinian side, the primary sources are the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) and the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC). On the Israeli side, key sources include the Palestine-Israel Pulse, the Peace Index and the Israeli Voice Index.

This review of public opinion on the two-state solution gives an insight into the changing level of support, concerns and potential obstacles and helps understand circumstances when support for peace efforts was high or low. Thus, it can indicate which actions Israeli and Palestinian leaders and peoples should pursue or avoid to increase support for the two-state solution, as well as which strategies and outreach efforts may be worth replicating or reconsidering.

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
PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION

The longest-running and most regularly conducted public opinion polling on the two-state solution (*inter alia*) among Palestinians is that conducted by the **Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR)** in Ramallah. Over the years, and regardless of fluctuations in support for the two-state solution, the vast majority of respondents consistently believed that the chances of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel within the next five years were slim or nonexistent. Support for the two-state solution has been closely linked to perceptions of its achievability and feasibility, which, in turn, are strongly influenced by ongoing Israeli settlement construction. Nonetheless, despite widespread skepticism about the viability of the two-state solution, a significant majority has continued to oppose the one-state alternative.¹

Findings also show that when the concept of the two-state solution is presented without additional context, a majority tends to oppose it. However, when defined as the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, a majority of the Palestinian public expresses support. Support further increases when specific conditions are attached. For example, 58.1% supported the two-state solution in 2019 if it included an “Israeli acknowledgement of and apology for the suffering of Palestinian refugees,” followed by 57.7% who favored it if both sides respected “the principles of international law”, and 55.2% who supported it on the condition that both sides reform their security, education and legislative sectors so that they serve peace.”²

Additional trends can be observed from the PCPSR surveys. Support for the two-state solution tends to be higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, higher among Fatah supporters than Hamas supporters, greater among those with lower levels of education than university graduates, and stronger among employees and merchants than among students. It is also more prevalent among those who identify as non-religious or only somewhat religious than among the religious. Notably, youth aged 18-22 show the highest levels of opposition to the two-state solution and the greatest support for an armed intifada.

The following graph illustrates how responses to the PCPSR’s recurring question – “Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution?” – have changed over time.



¹ <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154>.

² E.g., PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 72, June/July 2019.

Source: PCPSR, Public Opinion Polls, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154>.

The significant decline in support for the two-state solution began with the collapse of the peace process toward the end of the second Obama administration – marked by the failure of the Kerry proposal and the subsequent official suspension of talks – combined with Israel’s steady shift to the right, increasingly bold rejection of the two-state solution by right-wing governments, ongoing settlement expansion, deteriorating economic conditions, and the Israeli campaign on the Haram Al-Sharif. These factors fueled Palestinian despair, triggered the so-called Knives Intifada in 2015, and contributed to the erosion of support for the two-state solution. This increased around 2019 due to the negative public perception of the Trump administration’s “peace plan.” This period also saw a rise in support for armed attacks against Israelis. Support for the two-state solution hit an all-time low in 2023, particularly following settler attacks in Huwara³ and the northern West Bank, which coincided with increased public backing for armed resistance.

A notable shift occurred in early 2024 during the war on Gaza and amid renewed international calls to revive the two-state solution, which brought a sentiment of optimism among Palestinians, leading to an increase in support for the two-state model. This, despite the fact that in April 2024 the vast majority (83%) did not believe that recent statements from the US and other Western countries signaled a serious commitment to the initiative; only 15% believed the discourse was genuine. Interestingly, the rise in support was concentrated in the Gaza Strip, where approval reached 62% in March 2024, while support in the West Bank remained steady at 34%.⁴

Just three months later, support had dropped again to 32% in both the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, for roughly half of respondents in both regions, the top national priority remained an “Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”⁵

Another three months on, as the war in Gaza continued unabated, support for the two-state solution rebounded slightly to 39% (Gaza: 39%, West Bank: 38%)⁶ and remained stable at 40% (Gaza: 34%, West Bank: 45%) until May 2025.⁷ However, when the May 2025 poll defined the borders of the state without linking it to the two-state solution, support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967 rose to 61% (Gaza: 54%, West Bank: 66%), while 36% opposed such a state.⁸

A related question that these polls have tracked over an extended period concerns the perceived viability of the two-state solution in light of ongoing settlement expansion:

³ Settlers attacked the town of Huwara on 27 February 2023 and burned dozens of homes with residents inside as well as shops and cars and killed one civilian in a revenge attack following the killing of two settlers in the town earlier that day.


⁴ PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 91, April 2024.

⁵ PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 92, July 2024.

⁶ PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 93, September 2024.

⁷ PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 98, May 2025.


⁸ *Ibid.*



Source: PCPSR, Public Opinion Polls, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154>.


Over time, settlement expansion has been seen as the main obstacle to the viability of a Palestinian state, with about three-fifths of respondents holding this view. As illustrated in the two graphs above, the decline in support for the two-state solution closely correlates with a growing belief that such a solution is no longer feasible due to Israel's ongoing settlement expansion.

Until 2018, another longstanding question asked in the polls was whether, in light of the perceived failure of the two-state solution, a one-state alternative should be considered – one in which Arabs and Jews would share equal rights. Around two thirds of Palestinian respondents consistently opposed this idea, as shown in the following graph:




Source: PCPSR, Public Opinion Polls, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154>.

This fundamental rejection of the one-state paradigm was reinforced by responses to a similar question asked over an extended period, which presented a range of political alternatives in the event that negotiations failed or under prevailing conditions. One of the options was: "Abandon the two-state solution and demand the establishment of a single state for Palestinians and Israelis" as a means of securing Palestinian rights. The responses to this option were as follows:




Source: PCPSR, Public Opinion Polls, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154>.

The most recent PCPSR poll asked the public about support for the following possible solutions to the conflict, and the results further completed the picture that the two-state solution remains the preferred option for a majority of Palestinians and the one with the largest consensus, though support has also been declining:




Source: PCPSR, Public Opinion Polls, <https://pcpsr.org/en/node/997>.

The **Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC)** has also conducted regular public opinion polls among Palestinians, which since 1999 have asked the question “What is the most preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?”, with the following results⁹:



Source: JMCC and FES, West Bank Poll Results, May 2024.

Another organization that conducts surveys among Palestinians is the Ramallah-based **Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD)**. In opinion polls conducted in Gaza in May and August 2024, respondents expressed a clear preference for the two-state solution as their favored option for a final resolution to the conflict:




* Derived from the “Other” section. Source: Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), *Public Opinion Poll – Gaza Strip Gaza War, The Day After, Peace Process, National Reconciliation, Role of the Palestinian Authority*, September 2024; <https://www.awrad.org/en/article/10724/Public-Opinion-Poll-%E2%80%93-Gaza-Strip-Gaza-War,-The-Day-After,-Peace-Process,-National-Reconciliation,-Role-of-the-Palestinian-Authority->.

⁹ JMCC and FES, West Bank Poll Results, May 2024; https://mcusercontent.com/769c956beb1afecb70d94fe83/files/0eb2230d-9971-f633-2efc-f6de7ba6f025/102_WB_English_charts.pdf.


The August 2024 poll also inquired about the prospects for a "revival of peace negotiations to end the conflict and achieve the two-state solution." An overwhelming 72% of respondents believed it was "likely," while only 24% considered it "unlikely."¹⁰

In a subsequent poll conducted in November/December 2024, which now included respondents from both Gaza and the West Bank, the two-state solution remained the most preferred final-status option. Of those who favored this solution, 74% considered it "feasible," compared to 25% who deemed it "unfeasible":



Source: Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), *Palestinian Public Opinion Poll Gaza, Government Performance, Living Conditions, Public Trust, and Expectations for the Future*, December 2024; <https://www.awrad.org/files/server/polls/December%202024/AWRAD%20Public%20Opinion%20Poll%20-%20English%20-%20Main%20Results%20-%20December%202024.pdf>.

Additionally, the **Institute for Social and Economic Progress (ISEP)** in Ramallah has been conducting a series of polls since October 7, 2023 that included questions about the two-state solution. In December 2023, its "West Bank Street Pulse" survey asked respondents to rate their preferred political solution on a scale of 1 to 6 in a post-war referendum. The following options and results were presented:




Source: ISEP, West Bank Street Pulse, December 2023, <https://institute4progress.org/polls>.

¹⁰ Arab World for Research and Development, *Public Opinion Poll – Gaza Strip Gaza War, The Day After, Peace Process, National Reconciliation, Role of the Palestinian Authority*, September 2024; <https://www.awrad.org/en/article/10724/Public-Opinion-Poll-%E2%80%93-Gaza-Strip-Gaza-War,-The-Day-After,-Peace-Process,-National-Reconciliation,-Role-of-the-Palestinian-Authority->.


Here, too, the two-state solution was the clear preference for a majority of 51.4% of respondents. That support rose to 61.7% when the solution was “imminent” and “part of a negotiated agreement.”

From March 2024 to January 2025 (prior to the ceasefire), ISEP conducted four “War-time Perceptions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories” polls in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During this period, a stable majority of over 70% consistently stated that they would accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders – i.e., the two-state solution – if serious negotiations were to take place. However, willingness to support this solution dropped by 10% in Gaza.¹¹



Source: ISEP, War-time Perceptions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2024-2025, <https://institute4progress.org/polls>.

Meanwhile, acceptance for the one-state solution remained relatively steady in the West Bank at about one third of respondents (or between 30% and 37%), but saw a significant decline in Gaza. Where it shifted from roughly 60% to 35%:




Source: ISEP, War-time Perceptions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2024-2025, <https://institute4progress.org/polls>.

¹¹ Of the 72.5% of respondents who said they would accept the two-state solution in the March 2024 survey, 51% would also agree to a demilitarized state (West Bank: 41.2%, Gaza: 65.3%). ISEP, War-time Perceptions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, March 2024.

The Israeli-Palestinian **Geneva Initiative**, which advocates for a two-state solution to end the conflict, has also commissioned opinion polls on this topic. However, these surveys are conducted separately: by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) for the Palestinian Peace Coalition and the Midgam polling company for H.L. Education for Peace (see below under Israeli public opinion).

The Palestinian polls asked in September 2022 as well as in March and September 2024 for the preferred solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In all cases, the two-state solution was the clear favorite, with support increasing from 33% to 51% during the two-year period:



Source: Geneva Initiative Polls; <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/>.

When asked more specifically about “a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that leads to the creation of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, the evacuation of settlers and the implementation of minor mutual and equal adjustments?”, 50.4% of the respondents in the March 2024 poll expressed support while 45.5% opposed it.¹² In the same poll, 82.9% of the surveyed did not believe that the US administration was serious about its repeated declarations regarding a two-state solution and 75.3% believed that the war in Gaza had revived international attention to the conflict that could lead to increased recognition of Palestinian statehood.¹³

In the September 2024 poll, 70% of the respondents (73% of West Bankers and 65% of Gazans) supported “ending the war with a prisoner swap deal, return of Palestinian workers to Israel and having good-neighborly relations between the Palestinians and Israelis.”¹⁴

Another poll conducted in September 2024 by the American polling agency **Zogby Research Services**¹⁵ asked Palestinians to rate the desirability of one-state and two-state solutions to the conflict. The results


¹² <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/palestinian-public-opinion-poll-march-2024/>.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/palestinian-public-opinion-poll-sept-2024/>.


¹⁵ Zogby Research Services, September 2024 Poll; <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52750dd3e4b08c252c723404/t/673787409a10533cb7d424f3/1731692352642/Pal+2024.pdf>.

showed regional differences, with a clear majority of Gazans and Jerusalemites seeing an “optimistic” two-state solution as very or somewhat desirable, while only 54% of West Bankers agreed:



Source: Zogby Research Services, September 2024 Poll.

The most recent Zogby poll of April/May 2025 also revealed mixed views on the preferred long-term solution to the conflict with Israel, as the following graph shows.¹⁶ As the data show, support for the one-state and confederation options is low, while East Jerusalemites appear to favor none of the proposed solutions. West Bank respondents are divided between supporting the two-state solution and opting for none of the above, whereas Gazans show clearer support for the two-state solution.



Source: Zogby Research Services, Poll for Tony Blair Institute, April/May 2025.

¹⁶ <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52750dd3e4b08c252c723404/t/6834c9362a7d275289f2c5f7/1748289853688/TBI-Pal+2025+FINAL.pdf>.


ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION

With regard to surveys in Israel, it is important to note the significant disparity in responses between Jewish Israelis and Arab Israelis, with the latter showing much greater support for issues related to the two-state solution. The following discussion will focus on the attitudes and opinions of Israeli Jews.

Israeli public opinion has evolved significantly since the late 1970s. At that time, around 90% of Jewish Israelis opposed the idea of a Palestinian state, viewing it as a threat to Israel.¹⁷ By the mid-1980s, support for a two-state solution increased to 20%,¹⁸ and by 1994, during the height of the Oslo peace process, support had risen to 47.2%.¹⁹

Since then, support has fluctuated, but overall, it has dramatically declined over the three decades following the Oslo Accords. More recently, according to the **Palestine-Israel Pulse**, support dropped from 44% in September 2020 to 34% in late 2022.²⁰ Support was notably higher among Jewish Israelis over 55 years old (38%) compared to those aged 18-34 (20%). Additionally, Jewish Israelis were more likely to support a single non-democratic state without equality than a democratic state that would grant equal rights to Palestinians.²¹

The **Israeli Voice Index** arrived at similar results, observing a steady decline of Jewish Israelis' support for a two-state solution as part of a potential Israel-Palestinian peace agreement:



Sources: Israeli Voice Index, October 2018 and September 2022; <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/24664>; https://en.idi.org.il/media/18389/israeli_voice_index_2209_data_eng.pdf.

¹⁷ Magal, T., D. Bar-Tal, N. Oren & E. Halperin (2013), "Psychological Legitimization - Views of the Israeli Occupation by Jews in Israel: Data and Implications," in D. Bar-Tal & I. Schnell (ed.), *The Impact of Lasting Occupation*, New York: Oxford University Press, 122-186.

¹⁸ Arian, Asher (1995), *Security Threatened*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 105.

¹⁹ William Cubbison, "Two States for Two People? A Long Decline in Support," Israel Democracy Institute, October 23, 2018 (based on Peace Index); <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/24664>.

²⁰ Shikaki, K. "The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll Summary Report." PCPSR, Dec. 2022, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928>.

²¹ *Ibid.*

When asked whether the government should work towards advancing the two-state solution as a means of resolving the conflict with the Palestinians, support among Jewish Israelis dropped from 44% in February 2021 to 31% in September 2022. Meanwhile, 38% "strongly disagreed" and 20% "somewhat disagreed."²²

In the summer of 2021, another Israeli Voice Index poll found that the Israeli public was generally not enthusiastic about any solution to the conflict with the Palestinians. A plurality, 41.5%, found the continuation of the status quo most acceptable, while 33.8% supported the two-state solution and just 14.1% favored a one-state solution with equal rights for all.²³

In November 2023, an Israeli Voice Index poll asked for opinions – in the wake of the war in Gaza – on the question of a two-state solution in exchange for US assistance. Over half of the Jewish respondents (52%) said that Israel should not agree to this (while 55% of Arabs were in favor of it).²⁴

One year into the Gaza War, another Israeli Voice Index poll asked the Israeli public whether or not the Palestinian people had the right to their own state. While 89% of the Arabs affirmed this right, only 28% of Jewish respondents agreed.²⁵

Another ongoing survey project that was initiated by the **Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research** at Tel Aviv University in 1994 and is still being done jointly with the Open University and the Israel Democracy Institute is the so-called **Peace Index**.²⁶ In its most recent round, conducted in May 2024, 46.5% of Israelis were opposed to Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations (54% Jews and 11.7% Arabs) – down from 57.5% in January – and only 21.2% believed that negotiations would lead to peace in the coming years (15.4% Jews, 50.5% Arabs).

Regarding potential solutions, 32.5% of Israelis supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, with a sharp divide between Jews (26.1%) and Arabs (65.8%). Some 14.8% favored a binational state with full and equal rights for Jews and Palestinians (10.5% of Jews and 37.3% of Arabs). More extreme solutions found greater support among Jews: 21.9% overall supported annexing the occupied territories to create a single state under Israeli rule with limited Palestinian rights, including 36.1% of Jews and 10.1% of Arabs. Meanwhile, 22.5% supported continuing the status quo (24.3% of Jews and 13.1% of Arabs).²⁷

However, although nearly a third of Israelis supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state, only 14.2% of Israeli Jews believed such a solution could be achieved in the foreseeable future, compared to 36.4% of Arabs. Instead, almost half of Jewish respondents (49%) expected the current situation to persist, as did 20.2% of Arabs.²⁸

²² Israeli Voice Index, September 2022; https://en.idi.org.il/media/18389/israeli_voice_index_2209_data_eng.pdf.

²³ Israeli Voice Index, July 2021; https://en.idi.org.il/media/16681/israeli_voice_index_data_2107_eng.pdf.

²⁴ Israeli Voice Index, November 2023; https://en.idi.org.il/media/22223/israeli_voice_index_data_2311_eng.pdf.

²⁵ Israeli Voice Index, October 2024; https://en.idi.org.il/media/25455/israeli_voice_index_data_2409_eng.pdf.

²⁶ <https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex>.

²⁷ https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/sites/socsci-english.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/social/peaceindex/2024-05-findings.pdf.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

When asked about their opinion regarding negotiations for peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Israeli Jews' support reached an all-time low in January 2024²⁹ – most likely due to the lingering impact of the recent Gaza war – before rising again.³⁰

There was a clear correlation between attitudes to peace negotiations in general and the belief that such talks would actually lead to peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming years, as the following graph illustrates:




Source: The Peace Index (Tel Aviv University) <https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex>.

Israeli Jews' support for different solutions to the conflict has also shifted sharply in recent months, with a majority now clearly favoring the continuation of the existing situation – likely because they see no other realistic solution at this time and because positions have clearly hardened during the war.

²⁹ <https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex/archive/2024-01>.

³⁰ <https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex/archive/2024-05>, <https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex/archive/2024-11>.



Source: The Peace Index (Tel Aviv University) <https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex>.


Polling by the **Pew Research Center** in March and April 2023 – well before the Hamas attack – showed only 35% of Israelis (including both Jewish and Arab respondents) believed “a way could be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully”. This was a 9-percentage point decrease from 2017 and a 15-point drop from 2013. Among Israeli Jews, agreement with the statement dropped from 46% in 2013 to 32% in 2023 and among Israeli Arabs from 74% to 41%.³¹

A recent public opinion survey by the **Geneva Initiative** among Israelis, carried out in January 2024, asked about the most viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The two-state solution received the most votes (31.7%), closely followed by “Mass expulsion of Palestinians” and “Annexation without granting citizenship to Palestinians”³²:

³¹ <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/09/26/israelis-have-grown-more-skeptical-of-a-two-state-solution/>.

³² <https://geneva-accord.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GI-Midgam-Poll-January-2024-1.pdf>.

Most Viable Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Israelis)



Source: <https://geneva-accord.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GI-Midgam-Poll-January-2024-1.pdf>.


However, when the proposal was framed as an agreement with “return of the hostages, agreement to establish in the future a non-militarized Palestinian state in the West Bank & Gaza, and total normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia”, support for such an agreement rose to 51.3%.³³

Since the start of the Gaza War, the **Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)** has conducted several “Swords of Iron” surveys, four of which tackled the two-state question or asked about solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the earliest of them in April 2024.

When asked about accepting the two-state solution as part of a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia (an idea that was circulating at the time), 30% of the Jewish respondents expressed “great” or “somewhat” support in the April 2024 poll, while 57% objected.³⁴

Support for the establishment of a Palestinian state was objected by 54% of Israeli Jews, while 45% of Arabs agreed to it under any circumstances:

Support vs. Objection to the Establishment of a Palestinian State, April 2024




Source: INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results – April 2024; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/april-2024>.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results – April 2024; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/april-2024>.


In the same survey, 30% of Israeli Jews objected to any unilateral annexation of West Bank land, while 16% supported annexation of all Jewish inhabited areas, 13% supported annexation only of the settlement blocs, 8% supported annexation of the entire West Bank, and 3% only of the Jordan Valley.³⁵

When asked about the “best near-term option for Israel with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, answers were as follows:



Source: INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results – April 2024; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/april-2024>.

Two other “**Swords of Iron**” surveys conducted in September 2024 and February 2025 asked specifically about support or opposition to a two-state solution within the framework of a broad regional coalition arrangement with moderate Arab states. Support (“very” or “somewhat” supportive) for this scenario decreased from 31% to 25% during this period³⁶:



Source: INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results – September 2024 and February 2025.


³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results – September 2024 and February 2025; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-september-2024>, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-fabruary-2025>.

The results showed relatively low support for the two-state solution, and even this limited backing did not significantly increase when paired with potential incentives such as regional peace and normalization.

The February 2025 poll also asked about the best path forward for Israeli-Palestinian relations, revealing significant differences in public opinion. Only 19% of Jews compared to 80% of Arabs in Israel favored a permanent agreement. The Jewish public particularly leaned toward unilateral options, with 34.5% favoring disengagement from the Palestinians while maintaining security control and 31% favoring Israel's unilateral annexation of the West Bank. Another 15.5% preferred the continuation of the status quo.³⁷ The data underscores a clear sectoral divide between groups advocating for a comprehensive political settlement and those favoring the consolidation of Israeli control over the territory. This polarization reflects both short-term policy preferences and long-term visions for the region.

In the December 2024 survey, 54% of the Israeli public (Jews: 64%, Arabs: 12%) opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state, while another 30% (Jews: 23%, Arabs: 59%) supported it under certain conditions:



Source: INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results – March 2025; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-march-2025/>.

Among Israeli Jews, the most frequently cited important condition for the creation of a Palestinian state was the establishment of a regional settlement that includes a defensive alliance with Israel, moderate Arab states, and the US (19%). This was followed by guarantees that Israel would retain operational freedom of action to prevent terror (13%), a reform and deradicalization process within the Palestinian Authority (4%), and assurances that Hamas would not be part of the Palestinian government. Notably, however, a majority of Israeli Jews (58%) considered all these conditions equally important, highlighting a broad consensus around the need for multiple, interdependent security and political assurances.³⁸

A related question in the same survey referred to Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich's statement that Israel will assume sovereignty over the West Bank in 2025. Among the surveyed Israeli Jews, 29% opposed any annexation of territory, while 26% supported annexation only of the settlements and 24% supported annexing the entire West Bank.³⁹


In the most recent Swords of Iron survey, conducted in March 2025, 33% of the Israeli public supported 'separation from the Palestinians' as the best solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while 24% opted each for 'two states for two peoples' and for 'full annexation of the territories without granting

³⁷ INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results - February 2025; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-february-2025>.

³⁸ INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results - December 2024; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-december-2024/>.


³⁹ *Ibid.*

Palestinians civil rights’, albeit with significant differences between the Jewish and Arab public as the following graph shows. There was only agreement that the continuation of the current situation was not a solution. A one-state binational state was only supported by 4% of the public.⁴⁰



Source: INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results – December 2024; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-december-2024/>.

The **Geneva Initiative** polls on the Israeli side have also asked about support for the two-state solution (or for launching negotiations with the Palestinians on the basis of a two-state solution), with the following results:




Source: Geneva Initiative Polls, <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/>.

In some of the polls, respondents were presented with a list of options and asked to choose their preferred solution to the conflict. The results were as follows:

⁴⁰ INSS, Swords of Iron Survey Results - March 2025; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-march-2025/>


Preferred Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Israelis, 2022-24



Source: Geneva Initiative, Israeli Public Opinion Polls, July 2022, August and December 2024; <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/>.

In the May 2021 poll, only 17% of the respondents believed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would ever be solved, with a majority of those 17% (66%) thinking that any eventual agreement would be based on the two-state solution. However, 51% of the respondents believed the conflict would never be solved. Of those, 61% expected that the most likely scenario in 20 years would be the same situation as it is now, another 16% anticipated a violent conflict, 12% expected one state where Jews rule over Palestinians, and only 3% expected one democratic state where Israelis live with Palestinians.⁴¹


Will the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Ever Be Solved?



Source: Geneva Initiative, Israeli Public Opinion Poll, May 2021.

In January 2024, three months into the Gaza War, the Geneva Initiative poll asked Israelis to choose from a list of options what they thought was the most viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These were the answers:

Most Viable Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, January 2024




Source: Geneva Initiative, Israeli Public Opinion Poll, January 2024, <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/israeli-public-opinion-poll-january-2024/>.

⁴¹ <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/israeli-public-opinion-poll-may-2021/>.

In the December 2024 poll, a majority of 53.9% of Israeli respondents believed that the events of October 7th and the war in Gaza demonstrated the urgency of finding a solution to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (40.3% disagreed). Additionally, 52.5% believed that it was not possible to achieve long-term security for Israel without a political agreement with the Palestinians (35.5% believed it would be possible).⁴²

In the wake of the US elections and the impending return of Donald Trump as president, the December 2024 poll outlined three possible scenarios for the emergence of a Palestinian state and asked Israelis whether they would support or oppose them. While support generally outnumbered rejection, none of the three scenarios received majority support:


Scenarios under which a Palestinian State Could Emerge, December 2024



Source: Geneva Initiative, Israeli Public Opinion Poll, December 2024, <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/israeli-public-opinion-poll-december-2024>.

It is worth mentioning that the Geneva Initiative polls found a strong correlation between support for the two-state solution and age groups, with a clear generational gap. In the August 2024 poll, for example, overall support was 37.2%. However, support varied significantly across age groups: it was only 22.7% among 18-24-year-olds, steadily increasing to 47.5% among 65-74-year-olds, and 55.1% among those aged 75 and older.⁴³

Israeli Support for the Two State Solution by Age Group, August 2024




Source: Geneva Initiative, Israeli Public Opinion Poll, August 2024.

⁴² <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/israeli-public-opinion-poll-december-2024>.

⁴³ <https://geneva-accord.org/polls/israeli-public-opinion-poll-august-2024/>.

Polls by the **aChord** team based at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem asked the Israeli public: “Among the following options which policy would you like Trump to adopt regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?” The options were: (1) Promote a regional political-security arrangement that includes normalization with Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, and agreeing to establish a Palestinian state, (2) Promote full annexation of the West Bank, and (3) Other.

In several polls, around 45-50% of Israelis expressed support for the first option⁴⁴, and the latest poll conducted in January 2025 showed an even clearer majority of the general public, as well as an overwhelming majority among voters of parties currently in the opposition, in favor of normalization and (or at the cost of...) the establishment of a Palestinian state⁴⁵:



Source: aChord public opinion poll, 20-21 January 2025.

A similar study by the **Agam Research Institute**, also conducted in January 2025, likewise showed a majority of Israeli Jews supporting such a regional framework/arrangement that includes the establishment of a Palestinian state. The survey posed the following specific question: “If US President Trump were to promote a comprehensive political deal that includes normalization and a regional defense alliance between Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states; US security and economic guarantees for Israel; and in return, Israel would withdraw from parts of Gaza and agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in Palestinian territories under new leadership unaffiliated with terrorist organizations – how should Israel respond?”

Some 51% of the Jewish public supported this framework, 28% were not sure or didn’t know, and 21% said the deal must be refused, even at the cost of harming relations with Trump.⁴⁶


⁴⁴ E.g., aChord public opinion poll, https://achord.center/gaza-israel-war-survey-39_en.

⁴⁵ aChord public opinion poll, 20-21 January 2025, slide 21; https://achord.center/gaza-israel-war-survey-40_en.

⁴⁶ <https://agamlabs.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/7.pdf>.


JOINT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI POLLS

In the joint polls by **PCPSR** and the **Hebrew University's Truman Institute**, one consistent question related to the two-state solution was about mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people following the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues. Support for this concept has declined almost steadily among Palestinians over the years, from 52% in 2003 to 28% in 2023, while it remained higher among Israelis, at 65% and 63% respectively.⁴⁷



Source: Joint Polls 2002-2023, PCPSR and Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University; <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/255>.


Specific rounds of joint polls were conducted **among elites** on both sides in January 2018 and 2019. Asked about their opinion regarding the *general* concept of the two-state solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, the answers were as follows:



Source: Joint Elite Poll 1 - January 2018 - <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/719> and Joint Elite Poll 2 - January 2019 - <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/744>.


⁴⁷ Joint Polls 2002-2023, PCPSR and Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University; <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/255>.

While the two-state solution remained the preferred option, polls of the so-called **Palestinian-Israeli Pulse**, jointly conducted by **PCPSR**, **Israel Democracy Institute** and the **Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research** at Tel Aviv University since 2016, have also seen declining support. This trend is mainly attributed to the rise of fringe and minority groups (Israeli right-wing, Haredi, Palestinian Islamists), increasing distrust regarding the other side's true intentions, and growing skepticism about the viability of a two-state solution.⁴⁸



Source: Palestinian-Israeli Pulse Index, <https://pcpsr.org/en/node/680>, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/989>.

By December 2022, trust levels between the two sides were already very low, with 86% of Palestinians and 85% of Israeli Jews not considering the other side trustworthy. Some 84% on both sides perceived themselves as the exclusive victims, and 93% on both sides saw themselves as the rightful owners of the entire land. Willingness to promote good relations ranged from 70% among Israeli Arabs and 56% among Jews to only 22% of Palestinians.⁴⁹ The differing goals of the two sides are illustrated in the following graph⁵⁰:




Source: The Palestine/Israel Pulse: A Joint Poll, 2022, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928>.

⁴⁸ Shikaki, Khalil and Dahlia Scheindlin (2018), *Role of Public Opinion in the Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, *Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (2016-2018) – Final Report*; <https://pcpsr.org/en/node/742>.

⁴⁹ The Palestine/Israel Pulse: A Joint Poll, 2022, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928>.


⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

In the latest **Palestine-Israel Pulse** poll, conducted nearly one year into the Gaza War in September 2024, support for the two-state solution remained a minority position—21%among Israeli Jews. However, there were significant differences when broken down by population group, as the following graph shows. This pattern also applied to the prevailing belief that the two-state solution is no longer possible due to the war, political changes and settlement expansion, and to the idea of one democratic state, in which Palestinians and Jews would be citizens with equal rights:



Source: *Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll*, September 2024;
<https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Joint%20poll%2012%20Sept%202024%20English.pdf>


The **Two-State Index (TSI)**, which is produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team as part of the Geneva Initiative’s Two-State Coalition, has assessed the feasibility of the two-state solution since 2018, based on over 50 different parameters. The TSI started at 5.2 (out of 10) and had its peak in September 2022 at 5.73, after which it sharply declined. In the most recent edition, from December 2024, the TSI had reached its lowest point to date, at 4.91:



Source: Geneva Initiative, Two States Index (TSI), <https://index.genevainitiative.org/>.


Internationally, **Gallup** surveys have asked Palestinians (in the West Bank and East Jerusalem) and Israeli Jews (excluding settlers) whether they think that a permanent peace between Israel and Palestine will ever be achieved. Over time, the majority on both sides have responded rather negatively, though hopes for peace showed a slight increase in 2024 compared to 2023.

Will a Permanent Peace Between Israel and Palestine Ever Be Achieved?



Source: Gallup, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/650636/dim-outlook-peace-middle-east.aspx>.


Furthermore, Gallup polls found that, in general, twice as many people on both sides did not support the two-state solution as supported it. However, within Israel there is a large gap between Jews and the Arab minority: in the 2024 poll, for example, 75% of the Arabs supported it, but only 17% of Jews. The 2023-2024 survey results represent a clear reversal from where support stood more than a decade ago in 2012:



Source: Gallup, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/650636/dim-outlook-peace-middle-east.aspx>.


OTHER/REGIONAL POLLS

The **Arab Barometer** is a nonpartisan research network that conducts surveys on the attitudes and opinions of citizens across the Arab world. In its most recent eighth wave of surveys, conducted in January 2025, it included a question about the preferred solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict among four options: the two-state solution based on 1967 borders; one state for Jews and Arabs; a Palestinian-Israeli confederation; and “other”. Despite – or possibly because of – the war in Gaza, all of the countries surveyed named the two-state solution as their preferred option⁵¹:



Source: Arab Barometer, “How the Gaza War is Shaping MENA Public’s Support for the Two-State Solution,” January 2025.

Support for the two-state solution was not only the clear overall priority; it had actually increased in most of the countries since the previous wave of surveys in 2021-2022:



Source: Arab Barometer, “How the Gaza War is Shaping MENA Public’s Support for the Two-State Solution,” January 2025.

⁵¹ Arab Barometer, “How the Gaza War is Shaping MENA Public’s Support for the Two-State Solution,” January 2025; <https://www.arabbarometer.org/2025/01/support-for-the-two-state-solution-is-shifting-unexpectedly/>.

The findings highlight a clear consensus among the majority of respondents across the surveyed MENA countries: they believe that a lasting and sustainable peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through a two-state solution. This vision entails the creation of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state that exists peacefully alongside the state of Israel, reflecting a widely held conviction that coexistence is the most viable path forward for resolving the longstanding conflict. It also aligns with the Saudi/Arab peace initiative, which was endorsed by the Arab League in 2002.

CONCLUSION

Data indicates a widespread public belief that the two-state paradigm has lost its viability – at least under present conditions – and its prospects for regaining widespread legitimacy appear uncertain without profound changes in both the political landscape and public sentiment on either side. Years of stagnation, violence and settlement expansion have taken a toll, pushing both societies toward greater polarization, extremism, deep mistrust of the ‘other’ and skepticism about ever reaching any negotiated agreement.

However, public opinion is far more complex than one may assume and there is a certain level of pragmatism and a growing sense of wanting to find a solution to the conflict in some of the polls, which offers a potential opening for renewed engagement, especially if approached with sensitivity to public attitudes.

In the wake of the events of October 7th, 2023 and after, it may appear, especially in Israeli public discourse, that support for the creation of a Palestinian state has completely collapsed. However, survey data paints a more layered picture. While support for a two-state solution has declined and rarely commands a solid majority, it overall remains the most favored option when compared to alternatives. In contrast, the idea of a one-state solution – regardless of with or without equal rights for all – is rather unpopular and not supported by a majority on either side. Popular among Israelis is also the option of keeping the situation as is.

Data indicates that younger people exhibit the highest levels of opposition to the two-state solution, which may stem from a range of factors including, *inter alia*, growing political extremism, skepticism about the feasibility of peace negotiations, a lack of peace role models on both sides, or disillusionment with past efforts. If this age group continues to grow more resistant, the political and social groundwork needed for a sustainable peace becomes increasingly fragile. Thus, advocacy initiatives and educational activities promoting coexistence and the two-state solution must address first and foremost youth.

The priorities of Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank at times diverge significantly due to their distinct political and socioeconomic realities. In Gaza, where residents face dire humanitarian conditions, high unemployment and frequent military escalations, the population’s primary concerns tend to center around safety and economic needs. In contrast, West Bank residents tend to have a stronger emphasis on political defiance and resisting occupation, prioritizing actions like armed struggle and ending security coordination with Israel.⁵² These distinctions must be carefully taken into account when promoting or advocating for the two-state solution. A one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to resonate with both populations; instead, tailored strategies that reflect the unique political, economic and social realities of each area will be essential to effectively communicate the potential benefits and dividends of a two-state solution.

Overall, findings suggest that while the two-state solution is under serious strain, it is not entirely off the table. Rebuilding its legitimacy will require more than diplomatic declarations; it demands a realistic reassessment of conditions on the ground, a deeper understanding of public fears and hopes, and a reframing of the narrative around coexistence – one that speaks to security, justice, dignity and agency for both peoples.

⁵² E.g., <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/64869d67a16c416a1d1b0a99/t/67d0148333c58a3a14bbf4b1/1741690002494/ISEP+6++%281%29.pdf>.



**Palestinian Academic Society
for the Study of International Affairs**

Tel: +972-2-626-4426 / 628-6566 | Fax: +972-2-628 2819

Email: passia@passia.org | <https://passia.org/>

3, Hind Al-Husseini, Alley 2, Wadi Al-Joz | PO Box 19545, Jerusalem/Al-Quds

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