INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Today, after over seven years of negotiations and currently four years of stalemate and violence, it has become clear to all parties involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that the establishment of a Palestinian state is inevitable. But the core question about its area of sovereignty and of the land Israel intends to annex from the West Bank as well as from Jerusalem remains unresolved.

The struggle for land determining the conflict until this day began in 1947, when the United Nations recommended what it construed to be a ‘more or less even’ partition of Palestine into a Jewish state on 56.47% and an Arab state on 43.53% of the country. This was despite the fact that only 7% of the country was owned by Jewish inhabitants, who made up only one third of the country’s population. Palestinian rejection of the Partition Plan precipitated the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49, causing the flight (An-Nakba) of two thirds of the Palestinian population in the face of the Israeli forces and atrocities, that went on to conquer 78% of the country.

In 1967, Israel occupied the remainder of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip, WBGS). Ever since, consecutive Israeli governments have pursued a policy intended to disrupt the integrity of the Palestinian community and create apartheid-like enclaves, based on the presumption that the presence of Israeli settlements will make it more difficult to surrender territory and thus prevent any possibility of the establishment of a truly independent Palestinian state.

Also in 1967, the adoption of UNSC Resolution 242, calling on Israel to withdraw from all captured territory as a basis for peace, required Palestinians to accept the remaining 22% of their homeland for an independent state. When the Palestinian leadership, in November 1988, formally accepted this Resolution, they did so at the cost of 78% of historical Palestine, accepting less than half the allotment of the Partition Plan.

However, Israel failed to consider this historical territorial compromise as a fundamental step in ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and continued to establish settlements – in blatant violation of international law – in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (as well as the Golan Heights and Sinai, also captured in 1967). In doing so, Israeli settlement policy followed the pattern of earlier Zionist colonization in pursuing the realization of ‘Greater Israel’ and centered on securing as much control over the territories as possible, including their water and other natural and infrastructural resources.

It has become clear that Israel has no intention of stopping or even slowing settlement construction. Not only has the number of settlers in the WBGS doubled since the signing of the Oslo Accords, a complete new network of bypass roads has been established, eventually aiming at establishing an alternative road network for Palestinians, thus consolidating the factual Apartheid regime in the making. In addition, Israel’s construction of its separation barrier or ‘Wall’ in the West Bank and around Jerusalem has only been the latest step in the long-standing strategy of confiscating as much Palestinian land as possible, while, at the same time, limiting Palestinian development (prospects).

In continuing to pursue its illegal land-grab policies and consolidating control over the WBGS, Israel not only reduces the land area, territorial contiguity and economic viability of a Palestinian state, but also preempts the establishment of a viable independent Palestinian state and thus the possibility of a two-state solution.

This bulletin aims to present the fundamental facts and figures relating to the colonization policies of Israel.
Preempting the Two-State-Solution and the Settlements Wall

As international law prohibits the annexation of territory by force, Israel's colonization policy is considered illegal. The UN Charter itself states that territorial gains from war are unlawful, even if achieved in the course of self-defense, and that any state is obliged to withdraw once it has protected itself from danger. The most relevant articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention and UN Resolutions in this context are the following:

The Hague Convention IV (18 Oct. 1907)
Section II, Art. 23: "(...) it is especially forbidden – (...) (g) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; (...)"

Section III, Art. 46: "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 Dec. 1948)
Art. 17 (2): "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

Fourth Geneva Convention (1949)
Art. 47: "Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, (...) as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory."

Art. 49: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."

UN Security Council Resolutions
Res. 242 (22 Nov. 1967): Emphasizes "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war", and calls for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories.

Res. 446 (22 March 1979): "Determines that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in (...) territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity" and calls on Israel "to rescind its previous measures and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories."

Res. 452 (20 July 1979): "Calls upon the Government and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem."

Res. 465 (1 March 1980): "Determines that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the (...) territories occupied since 1967, (...) have no legal validity" and calls on Israel "to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem."

UN General Assembly Resolutions
Res. 2649 XXV (30 Nov. 1970): "(...) 4. Considers that the acquisition and retention of territory in contravention of the right of the people of that territory to self-determination is inadmissible and a gross violation of the Charter."

Res. 3005 XXVII (Dec. 1972): "2. Strongly calls upon Israel to rescind forthwith and desist from, all such policies and practices as: (a) The annexation of any part of the occupied territories; (b) The establishment of Israeli settlements in those territories and the transfer of parts of an alien population into the occupied territories; (c) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses and the confiscation and expropriation of property; (d) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of the occupied territories; (e) The denial of the right of the displaced persons to return to their homes; 3. Reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel in contravention of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to settle the occupied territories, including occupied Jerusalem, are null and void."

Res. 3525 A (15 Dec. 1975): "5. Condemns, in particular, the following Israeli policies and practices: (a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories; (b) The establishment of Israeli settlements (...);(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property (...);(i) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories. 6. Declares that those policies and practices of Israel constitute grave violations of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the principles and provisions of international law concerning occupation, and constitute as well an impediment to the establishment of a just and lasting peace."
With the signing of the Oslo Accords the Palestinians agreed to defer all difficult issues, incl. settlements, to a later stage in exchange for an Israeli commitment to disengage from the OPT and preserve the territorial integrity of the WBGS. This, although the Oslo Accords include a broad range of protective measures for the settlements and settlers – such as their exclusion from Palestinian jurisdiction, blanket limitations on Palestinian land use near settlements, as well as Israeli control over land registration, zoning and security. Israel has continued to take unilateral actions, all of which are aimed at creating more irreversible facts on the ground in violation of international law (see Box 1).

The Palestinian position remains that Israeli settlements are illegal, and prejudice the viability of a two-state solution and therefore must be evacuated, incl. those in East Jerusalem. However, despite their belief that any solution to the settlement problem is founded in international law and requires Israel to comply with UN Resolution 242 and withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines, Palestinians have shown readiness to make limited concessions in the form of land exchanges that would enable Israel to incorporate some settlements adjacent to the Green Line in return for nearby land from Israel of equal potential and value. In doing so, it is stressed, the Palestinians are negotiating upon territory that represents only 22% of the total area of historical Palestine and what is usually termed as Israeli ‘offers’ and ‘compromises’ is by no means perceived as ‘giving’ or ‘returning’ but as taking even more of this land (see also Map 1).

The Israeli position, however, disregards international law and insists upon the annexation of West Bank territory ranging (most recently) from about 47% down to a minimum of 7%, depending on the presence of either a Likud or Labor-dominated government. If together in a new coalition, supported by a majority of the Israeli electorate, chances are low that such an annexation would be less than 11% and could amount to 20% of the West Bank, if Israel would insist on a so-called ‘security zone’ in the Jordan Valley.

Both Israeli mainstream parties still draw guidance from the so-called Allon Plan – first formulated in 1967 and subsequently altered, renamed, adapted and amended by consecutive Israeli governments and military strategists. In each ‘guise’ Israeli commitments have remained the same; firstly, ensuring the Jewish character of the State of Israel, and secondly, securing Israel’s geo-political domination of all of the country "between the (Mediterranean) Sea and the (Jordan) River," by holding on to the Jordan Valley as well as border strips stretching beyond the Green Line toward and around ‘Greater’ Jerusalem.

The agreements signed by Israel and the PLO as part of the peace process prohibit actions, which destroy the territorial integrity and status or otherwise change the status of the WBGS. The 1993 Declaration of Principles – as well as subsequent agreements - stipulated that “The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period,” (DoP, Art. IV). The September 1995 Interim Agreement, stated that "Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations” (Art. XXXI, Clause 7), and that "in order to maintain the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, and to promote their economic growth and the demographic and geographical links between them, both sides shall implement the provisions of this Annex, while respecting and preserving without obstacles, normal and smooth movement of people, vehicles, and goods within the West Bank, and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (Annex I, Article 1, Clauses 2-4). Furthermore, both the Wye Memorandum of Oct. 1998 and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum of Sept. 1999 recognized "the necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement” (Art. V and Art. 10 respectively).

The to date most far reaching - though eventually unsuccessful - talks took place at Camp David in July 2000 in an attempt to conclude final status negotiations. From the maps made available by the Palestinian Orient House team it seems likely that Israel demanded the annexation of most of the settlements, and that territorial continuity was denied to the Palestinian “entity” in order to achieve this aim. The settlements in East Jerusalem, Gush Etzion near Hebron, and large blocs such as the Shomron settlements in the northern West Bank were all to become part of Israel. Based on the deliberations at Camp David, then-US President Clinton published on the eve of his departure from the White House his so-called Parameters, proposing with regard to territory and settlements, four guiding principles: 80% of settlers in blocs, contiguity, minimize annexed areas, minimize the number of Palestinians affected.

In January 2001, the last round of official talks were held in Taba before Prime Minister Barak was defeated by Ariel Sharon in the Israeli elections. According to the so-called ‘Moratinos Non-Paper,’ based on minutes taken by the EU envoy at those talks, the Israeli and Palestinian sides had agreed that the large settlements blocs in the northern West Bank, in addition to the Jerusalem and Gush Etzion settlements, were to be annexed while continuity between the Palestinian areas was assured but significant amounts of the West Bank were to be swapped with disconnected land in the Negev Desert.

In a bid to curb the ongoing violence, the ‘Mitchell Committee’ was sent on a fact-finding mission to the territories in spring 2001. In April 2001, it presented its recommendations, unambiguously condemning Israel’s continuing policies of land confiscation, property destruction and settlement expansion as illegal and as obstacle to peace, and calling for a “freeze of all settlement activity, including the ‘natural growth’ of existing settlements.”

Since then, several initiatives – both of official and private nature - were launched aiming at overcoming the current impasse and reviving the peace talks. In Sept. 2002, the People’s Voice campaign was published, which proposed regarding the settlement issue that, “after establishment of the agreed border, no settler will remain in the Palestinian state,” whereby the initiative called for borders to be based on the June 1967 lines with “border modifications” and equal land exchanges.

In April 2003, the Quartet (UN, US, EU and Russia) published the ‘road map peace plan’ aiming at a three-staged final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005, based on a two-state solution, starting with steps to normalize conditions, including an end to Palestinian ‘terrorism’ and a freeze on Israeli settlements, including “natural growth” (a neat loophole that Israel had exploited in the past). The final status of the settlements was to be determined during the third and last stage, where all outstanding issues were to be resolved. At present, the road map is still the accepted official plan for achieving peace in the region.

In Dec. 2003, a group of Israeli and Palestinian personalities launched the Geneva Accord, which, inter alia, calls for the dismantling of 120 out of 140 settlements and the evacuation of a large number of settlers though it fails to specify details regarding which settlements will be removed; however, the accompanying maps suggest that most settlements will go while the settlements in East Jerusalem are amongst those which will remain intact and become part of Israel. The infrastructure of the settlements are supposed to be handed over to the Palestinian state and it has been proposed that they should be offset against the compensation Israel will pay to the refugees displaced in 1948.

Shortly after the launch of the Geneva Accord, and at the peak of international criticism of the Wall, with the hearings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague just ahead, PM Sharon proposed his own initiative, a unilateral...
In 2002 Israel approved the construction of a **permanent barrier** to effectuate a physical separation from Palestinian populated areas on the West Bank (see Box 2 on the "illegality" of the barrier). However, the barrier – more commonly referred to as ‘the Wall’ - will according to its trajectory not separate the West Bank from Israel proper; instead it incorporates substantial West Bank areas east of the Green Line that are crucial for the Palestinian economy, such as the foothills and plains where modern irrigated agriculture has great potential. Israel incorporates these lands but keeps the Palestinian rural population secluded from them behind the Wall. Although permitting restricted access to landowning farmers, the majority of Palestinian citizens is barred access to what are now designated ‘closed seam zones.’ Complaints by farmers about the regime regulating access to their fields at the other side of the wall, hindering proper cultivation, are ignored by the Israeli authorities.

**Continued on page 8**

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**Box 2: The International Court of Justice’s Ruling on Israel’s Wall**

On 8 December 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/14, requesting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to render an advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, considering the rules and principles of international law as well as relevant UN resolutions. On 19 December 2003, the ICJ set 30 January 2004 as the date for written statements to be submitted on the matter and 23 February 2004 as the date for the actual hearings to begin.

On 9 July 2004, the ICJ determined the **legal consequences of the construction** of Israel’s Wall in the West Bank, saying that: (i) in order to build the wall, Israel destroyed or confiscated Palestinian property in violation of international law (para. 132); (ii) Israel’s severe restrictions on Palestinian movement violate international human rights and humanitarian law (para. 134); (iii) the wall impedes the right of Palestinians to work, health, education and to an adequate standard of living (para. 134); and (iv) the wall “severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination” (para. 122).

The court further determined that “whilst taking note of the assurance given by Israel that the construction of the wall does not amount to annexation and that the wall is of a temporary nature, the Court nevertheless considers that the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation” (para. 121)(emphasis added).

In conclusion, the ICJ stated that “the construction of the wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is contrary to international law...” (para. 162) and ruled that Israel must “cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem” (para. 151). The Court also ruled that Israel must **dismantle the wall**, pay compensation to the Palestinian population, and “return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (para. 153)(emphasis added).

The ICJ further confirmed that “The territories situated between the Green Line and the former eastern boundary under the Mandate of Palestine were occupied by Israel in 1967...[i]t remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to have the status of an occupying Power” (para. 78) and that Israeli settlements “have been established in breach of international law” (para. 120)(emphasis added).

For further information see: http://www.nad-plo.org/wprimary.php; for a full legal analysis with statements, documents and maps see http://www.palestine-un.org/icj/index.html
MAP 2: The Wall and Proposed Israeli Unilateral Disengagement, December 2004

West Bank Area Percentages After the Wall

- Areas West of the Wall: 6.1%
- Approved Wall Sections around Ariel Settlement Bloc: 2.1%
- Settlement Bloc Areas behind the Wall: 9.7%
- Jordan Valley: 29.1%
- Remaining Palestinian Areas East of the Wall: 53%

Percentages of Palestinian West Bank Population Directly Affected by the Wall

- Population Isolated outside the Walled Areas: 9.2%
- Population Separated from Cultivated Land by the Wall: 9.7%
- Population Separated from Cultivated Land by Wall Sections around the Ariel Settlement Bloc: 3.1%
Preempting the Two-State-Solution

MAP 3: Israel’s West Bank Road Plan and Disengagement, 2004

Traditional Palestinian Trunk Road System
Israel (Re)Constructed Highway Network
Palestinian Traditional Road Section Incorporated in Israeli Highway Network
Alternative Palestinian Thoroughfares
Existing Palestinian Under- or Overpass
Israeli-Proposed Palestinian Under- or Overpass
Projected Area of Israeli-Proposed Disengagement in the Northern West Bank, December 2005
Projected Area of Further Israeli Disengagement

Israel Urban / Rural Settlement
Settlements to be evacuated by Israel, September 2005
Green Line 1949

23%
47%
53%
30%

Israeli Disengagement in Area Percentages of the West Bank
Projected Israeli Disengagement from the Northern West Bank
Projected Further Israeli Disengagement
Palestinian Autonomous Areas (Oslo A and B)
Projected Israeli-Controlled Area

Map: © Jan de Jong
BOX 3: WALL TIMELINE


July 1997: DM Yitzhak Mordechai objects to the Rabin govt.’s separation fence plan and shelves it.

Nov. 2000: PM and DM Ehud Barak decides, following the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, to build an obstacle to Palestinian vehicles in the Latroun area.

May 2001: MK Haim Ramon calls to form a unilateral separation movement.

June 2001: Sharon orders to set up steering teams for the fence headed by National Security Council head Uzi Dayan.

July 18, 2001: The cabinet approves Dayan’s plan: the Israeli army will safeguard the east side of the seam line area, the border police will safeguard the western side. The cabinet also decided to build a barrier against passage of people in select sections.

April 14, 2002: In response to a suicide attack on a Netanya hotel three weeks earlier, a ministerial defense committee decides on a seam line administration.

June 2002: PM Sharon approves the DM’s proposal for a fence route between Israel and the West Bank, with a first section running 100 km from Salem in the north to Kufir Qasem.

Aug. 2002: The route to Elkana is approved and it was agreed to build the fence in two sections north and south of Jerusalem.

July 2003: The first stage of the seam line project between Salem and Elkana is completed.

Oct. 3, 2003: The Israeli cabinet approves the 430-km seam line route from Elkana to Um Derj near Arad.

Nov. 2003: Phase Three begins, along 100 km southbound from Elkana to the Ofer Camp near Jerusalem.

Dec. 8, 2003: The UNGA approves an appeal to the International Court for Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to debate the fence’s legality.

Jan. 30, 2004: Israel states the fence is a security issue, not a legal-political one.

Feb. 2004: Work on the fence is halted due to petitions by Palestinian residents and the Council for Peace and Security to the High Court of Justice against confiscating lands.

June 30, 2004: The Israeli High Court rejects 30 km of the fence’s 40 km route.

July 9, 2004: The ICJ rules that the Wall is illegal.

(Source: Ha’aretz, 11 July 2004)

Continued from page 5

It is mainly in Jerusalem, where the Wall will incorporate a large number of Palestinians (citizens of the annexed eastern part), running closely not along the Green Line but along the municipal limits established unilaterally by Israel to incorporate East Jerusalem in 1967.

In consequence, all of East Jerusalem’s suburbs are fenced out from the city on which they depend for services and employment. While keeping these large townships (e.g., Ar-Ram, Anata and Al-Izzariyya) out, the same wall incorporates adjacent large settlement bloc areas such as Etzion and Giv’on (see Map 2), with vast reserves of open land targeted for large-scale settlement expansion.

Map 2 (see page 6) pictures the vital changes in the territorial composition of the West Bank effectuated by the Wall. Characteristic of the new situation is the increasing segregation of settlement-controlled areas from ever contracting Palestinian population domains, which are becoming further fragmented in the process by a next wave of settlement expansion and the construction of so-called ‘bypass-highways.’

Map 3 (see page 7) details the new reality taking shape upon the completion of the network of ‘bypass’-highways linking settlements to one another and to Israel proper. Constructing this network was greatly aided by the Oslo Accords, which occasioned the division of the West Bank into areas of Palestinian self-rule and areas kept under Israeli control, facilitating the emergence of territorial corridors slicing through the former areas, which got reinforced by the ‘bypass’ highways as their infrastructural backbones.

Only recently Israel submitted a proposal for the restoration of Palestinian road contiguity which was disrupted by the ‘bypass’-highway network. Key components of the proposal are planned overpasses and tunnels for Palestinian traffic to go under or over the highways which will be severed from the roads left to Palestinians and are left to serve settlements only, ensuring their contiguity and viability.

Palestinian contiguity will be residual underneath the contiguity reserved for the settlers. These contiguities do not compare. That what is left for the Palestinians is critically inferior to that reserved for the settlements. The alternative Palestinian thoroughfares need to cross very difficult terrain with steep slopes, pass through numerous built-up areas and can only accommodate a limited flow of traffic. Palestinian officials have consequently rejected the road plan for having a detrimental effect on the chances of rehabilitating the Palestinian economy.

There is however little doubt that Israel intends to carry out the road plan anyhow as a key condition to enable and facilitate its intended disengagement from Palestinian land. Not from most of the settlements, as can be gathered from the locations where tunnels and bridges are proposed. Altogether it indicates a planned disengagement from about 53% of the West Bank.
Preempting the Two-State-Solution

According to B'Tselem, there are currently 17 roads (totaling some 120 km) in the WBGS.

Concerned

The Disengagement Plan

At a Glance - Settlements Facts & Figures

Population

- Settlers comprise less than 10% of the total Israeli-Jewish population!
- Within the WBGS, Israeli settlers constitute approx. 9% of the total West Bank population, and less than 0.6% of the Gaza population.
- Some 35% of the settlers live in the Greater Jerusalem area.
- The PCBS puts the total settler population in 2003 at 415,383, distributed as follows: 223,199 in the WB, 184,589 in Jerusalem and 7,595 in Gaza.
- According to figures released by the Interior Min., the settler population of the WBGS grew in the period from June 2003 to June 2004 by 12,306 (5.32%) to a total of 245,000 settlers. Two-thirds of the overall growth is attributed to the 3.5% annual fertility rate among settlers while the remaining third actually moved to the settlements. Most of the growth occurred in the ultra-Orthodox settlements of Betar Illit, Modi’in Illit and Kookhav Ya’akov.

Settlements

- According to the PALDIS database, there are 163 settlements in the WBGS, 17 of which in Gaza. Peace Now counts 148 settlements in the WBGS, 17 of which in Gaza (see list and map, page 10 and 11). The PCBS identifies 172 formal Israeli settlements, incl. 17 in Gaza, and according to figures from the Israeli Min. of Interior and the CBS, 143 settlements have been built in the WBGS since 1967, with the last one having been established in 1997.
- As of July 2004, Peace Now reported a total of 97 outposts, of which 52 were erected after March 2001.
- As of June 2004, settlement expansion activity - new and continuing was underway at 73 locations, incl. 12 settlements in Gaza, covering almost 500,000 m². (Peace Now, Aerial Survey March–June 2004)
- According to Peace Now, the settlements cost Israel at least $556 million per year.
- Some 85% of West Bank settlements, excluding those in East Jerusalem, are almost insignificantly small in residential size and capacity; the largest of them can be compared to small villages of about 1 km², with, on average, some 700 inhabitants. Only 15% - some 20 settlements - resemble small townships, reaching averages of about 6,000 residents. Two from this group - Ma’ale Adummim and Ariel - have been granted city status, with populations of over 25,000 and 16,000 respectively while another four - Giv’at Ze’ev, Modi’in Illit, Betar and Efrata - are currently developing into small towns, reaching averages of about 10–15,000 inhabitants.
- The municipal cluster of some 10 Jerusalem settlements houses half of all West Bank settlers, in urban densities unparalleled with other settlements, yet occupying a total area of less than 0.2% of the West Bank. West Bank settlements outside Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries consume only 1.4% of the West Bank, bringing the total percentage of currently built-up settlement land in the West Bank to 1.6%.

Roads and Bypass Roads

- The actual built-up areas of the settlements is tiny, but to maintain them, a network of roads and bypass roads, fences, buffer zones and outposts are used to maintain control over much larger areas, while Palestinians are forbidden to build near settlements or within 150 meters of the bypass roads that serve them. Bypass roads are under Israeli control and entail a 50-75-m buffer zone on each side of the road in which no construction is allowed.
- The PCBS counted 785.9 km of bypass roads in the WBGS in 2003 (735.5 km in the WB, 50.4 km in the GS).
- According to B’Tselem, there are currently 17 roads (totaling some 120 km) in the WBGS that are completely prohibited for Palestinians as well as 10 roads (totaling 245 km) that are partially prohibited. In addition, there are 14 roads or sections (totaling 365 km) on which Palestinian travel is restricted. (B’Tselem, Forbidden Roads, August 2004).

The Disengagement Plan

- Concerned settlements: Total 21 – 17 in Gaza (Nisanit, Dugit, Alei Sinai, Netzarim, Kfar Darom, Morag, and 11 Gush Katif settlements) and 4 in the northern West Bank (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, and Homesh). The 17 Gaza settlements are home to 7,254 settlers (as of end-2003) and occupy 15–20% of the land. However, Israel controls up to 38% of Gaza, covering the settlements, military installations, ‘yellow’ areas, and buffer zones along the borders, certain roads and around settlements. The four West Bank settlements are ‘dormitory communities’ with a tiny population of approx. 550. (The World Bank, Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements, June 2004).

Cartoon by Omayya Joha, http://omayya.com
Caption: Arrow reads: “Final Solution”
### RESIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Pop. 2002</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Bank</strong></td>
<td>Total: 136 settlements 220,491</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adora</td>
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<td>Aiki Zahav</td>
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<td>Almog</td>
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<td>Hagga'i (Bet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halanish (Neve Tzuf)</td>
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<td>Kedumim</td>
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<td>Kfar Rut</td>
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<td>Kiryat Netafim</td>
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<td>Ma'ale Amos</td>
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<th><strong>Gaza Strip</strong></th>
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<td>Al Siyti</td>
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<td>Bedolah</td>
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<td>Ben Atzmon</td>
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<td>Gadid</td>
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<td>Ganem Yal</td>
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<td>Gan Or</td>
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<td>Dugit</td>
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<td>Kfar Darom</td>
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<td>Margai</td>
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<td>Neve Dekalim</td>
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<td>Nissani</td>
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<td>Netzer Hazani</td>
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<td>Rahlia Yarm</td>
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<td>Selaw</td>
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<th><strong>East Jerusalem</strong></th>
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<td>Ramot Alon</td>
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<td>Ramat Shlomo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramot Estkol</td>
<td>15,226</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neve Ya'akov</td>
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<td>Pisgat Ze'ev</td>
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<tr>
<td>Giv'at Shapiro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Old City, Jewish Qtr.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Talpiot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gilo</td>
<td>28,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Homa</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL WBGS:</td>
<td>407,594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 incl. Gin'on camp and Har Shmu'el neighborhood  
2 incl. Ganei Modi'in and Ramat Modi'in  
3 incl. Nofei Prat and Alon neighborhood  
4 incl. Kiryat Sefer, neighborhoods of Mattityahu and Or Sam Yehah  
5 incl. Giv'on HaMivtar and Mt. Dafna  
6 incl. Giv'on HaMezlama and Mt. Scopus  
7 incl. Ir David, Kfar David and HaShiloah  
8 incl. Giv'on HaMatos  

* NB: Some West Bank settlements are located partly in the West Bank or in No Man's Land, but are listed anywhere since they are not entirely in Israel. Settlements with no population figures have either no number recorded officially (in most Nahal settlements) or are listed under another locality, sometimes within Israel.

Source: PALDIS Database, 2004
Preempting the Two-State-Solution

December 2004

Israeli Disengagement, and Projected Settlements, the Wall

MAP 4: Settlements, the Wall and Projected Israeli Disengagement, December 2004

- Wall Trajectory approved by Israel’s Cabinet (30 June, 2004)
- Approved Wall Sections around the Ariel Settlement Bloc
- Settlement Bloc Areas behind the Wall
- Israeli-Controlled Areas of the Jordan Valley
- Projection of Wall Trajectory South of Hebron approved by Israeli Min. of Defence (Nov. 2004)
- Palestinian Populated Areas of East Jerusalem beyond the Wall
- Possible Locally Rerouted Wall Section (Barta’a East)
- Projected Area of Israeli Disengagement
-Israeli Disengagement Areas currently designated as Oslo-C Zones
- Israeli Urban / Rural Settlements
- Settlements to be evacuated by under the disengagement Plan
- Israeli Military Facility
- Green Line 1949

Map: © Jan de Jong
ISRAELI OPTIONS FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE

Map 5 presents basic projections of options for a Palestinian state advanced by Israeli politicians since the failed Camp David talks in July 2000. First, it shows the areas of projected Israeli disengagement from the West Bank, leaving 53% of the West Bank within factually emerging borderlines separating a Palestinian self-ruling domain from that of the settlements, which are being consolidated into blocs linked with closed zones to the west (the ‘Seam Zone’, behind the Wall) and to the east (the Jordan Valley).

The second option leaves 93%-89% of the West Bank east of the Wall for Palestinian statehood (the orange-yellow colored areas behind the solid blue line - 93%) and eventually in decrease the areas behind the broken blue line (89%) indicated in the Map’s Legend as Option 3. The first one is roughly similar to the 2001 Taba proposal, the latter is resembling the configuration proposed by Israel at the July 2000 Camp David talks.

The outlines of both options depicted on the map are aligned with the trajectory of the constructed and approved wall of today, except for the outlying Palestinian sections of East Jerusalem, which in both initial options of Camp David and Taba were intended to be transferred to Palestinian Authority.

The Map includes a projection of a ‘security zone’ in the Jordan Valley likely to be demanded by Israel under the above main options.

The Map further pictures the borderlines proposed by the Geneva Initiative or Accord. It recommends the exchange of about 2% of the West Bank area for land of equal size across the Green Line, adjacent to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, most of which was conquered by Israel in 1948-49 (for comparison, see the lines of the UN Partition Plan on Map 1, page 3 of this bulletin).

Selected Quotes

You don’t want to end the occupation and you don’t want to stop the settlements, so the only way to convince you is by force. This is the Intifada of peace.

(Marwan Barghouthi, interview with Ma’ariv, 9 Nov. 2001)

It’s either settlements or peace. Both cannot go together. It’s the main issue for us in the road map.


Israeli settlement activity has severely undermined Palestinian trust and hope. It preempts and prejudges the outcome of negotiations and, in doing so, cripples chances for real peace and security. The United States has long opposed settlement activity. Consistent with the report of the committee headed by Senator George Mitchell, settlement activity must stop.

(US Secretary of State Colin Powell, speech at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, 19 Nov. 2001)

There is a question in the minds of Palestinians and questions in the minds of many people around the world as to whether or not one can actually bring into being a viable Palestinian state without doing something about the settlement activity and the outposts and the settlements that are there. This will be one of the most difficult issues we have to deal with.

(US Secretary of State Colin Powell, interview with Israel TV Channel 2, 12 May 2003)

The settlement outposts worry us a great deal, and we were happy to let the Americans lead the dialogue with Israel regarding upholding its commitments in the framework of the road map [evacuating all of the settlement outposts built since March 2001]. But not a thing happened. Ignoring for a moment the expansion of construction in Ma’ale Adumim, how is it possible to build a two-state model at a time that Israel is building infrastructures for additional settlements, paving a road from Ariel to the Jordan Rift, and linking Ma’ale Adumim to the Ben-Gurion Airport highway? How is all this compatible with the principle of a Palestinian state that is territorially contiguous?

(Marc Otte, European Union special representative for the Middle East Peace Process, Ha’aretz, 29 October 2004)
Preempting the Two-State-Solution

MAP 5: Israeli Options for a Palestinian State

1. Projected area designated for Palestinian statehood by dominant circles in the Israeli Likud Party. Areas to be annexed by Israel under that option.

2. Projected area designated for Palestinian statehood by dominant circles in the Israeli Labor Party.

3. Projected area likely demanded by the Likud Party to be annexed to Israel in exchange for areas of Palestinian statehood preferred by the Labor Party.

4. Jordan Valley area probably demanded to remain under Israeli control by the Likud Party.

Legend:
- Boundary of Palestinian State as proposed by the ‘Geneva Initiative’
- Israeli Urban / Rural Settlements
- Settlements to be evacuated under the Disengagement Plan
- Green Line 1949

Territorial Options in Percentages of the West Bank:
- Israeli Annexation of 7% of the West Bank (Legend Option 1, see box above)
- Additional Israeli Annexation of 4% of the West Bank (Legend Option 3), amounting to a total of 11%
- Jordan Valley Zone under Legend Option 4, comprising 9% of the West Bank
- Palestinian Area after an Israeli Annexation of 7% of the West Bank (Legend Option 2)
- Remaining Palestinian Area on the West Bank after Projected Israeli Disengagement
- 53% of projected area designated for Palestinian statehood by dominant circles in the Israeli Likud Party
- 4% of projected area designated for Palestinian statehood by dominant circles in the Israeli Labor Party
- 7% of projected area likely demanded by the Likud Party to be annexed to Israel in exchange for areas of Palestinian statehood preferred by the Labor Party
- 11% of Jordan Valley area probably demanded to remain under Israeli control by the Likud Party
- 9% of remaining Palestinian Area on the West Bank after Projected Israeli Disengagement
- 40% of remaining Palestinian Area on the West Bank after Projected Israeli Disengagement
- 20% of remaining Palestinian Area on the West Bank after Projected Israeli Disengagement
- 80% of remaining Palestinian Area on the West Bank after Projected Israeli Disengagement

Map: © Jan de Jong
The following three maps picture the serious impacts that Israeli settlements and related infrastructure of the Wall and the separated road networks have on Palestinian livelihoods: Map 6 pictures immediate impacts on Palestinian localities in and around the city of Qalqilya; Map 7 widens the framework from a local scale to that of a whole region, in this case of the district of Nablus; and Map 8 summarizes the projected impacts within a framework encompassing all of the West Bank, as the vital core of the targeted Palestinian State.

Map 6 (Qalqilya and surroundings) focuses on the Wall’s direct impacts on local communities. All depicted Palestinian localities are separated from vital land resources by the Wall. Villages such as Falamyia, and in particular Jayyus, can no longer profitably cultivate their irrigated fields, because of restricted access for workers and of limitations in harvesting and marketing produce. The city of Qalqilya, forming an urban unit together with the adjacent township of Habla, is left with only a tunnel to access that place and is now deprived of vital areas along the highway, targeted earlier for an urgently needed municipal industrial zone.

The socioeconomic potential of areas alienated from Palestinians is now being allocated for the benefit of the Zufin and Alfei Menashe settlements. The map shows how Zufin is expanding across the lands of Jayyus from one piece of the Wall to the opposite section, threatening a complete cut-off for the village farmers from their lands that generate practically all of the village’s income.

Map 7 (see page 15) details the geo-political and socioeconomic reconfiguration of the Nablus district as a consequence of the Wall, expanding settlements and the Israeli-proposed alternative Palestinian thoroughfares underneath the settler highway network. The map pictures how the city of Nablus will be encapsulated by a tight belt of highways cutting it off from urgently needed areas of urban development. It further shows how the city’s rural surroundings are turned into ‘peninsular’ regions left with just rudimentary links to the main city, while robbed from direct links to neighboring rural areas.
Preempting the Two-State-Solution and the Settlements/Wall

The map shows the locations of proposed cross-border industry parks in an attempt to make up in whatever degree for the impending loss of viability for the targeted Palestinian state.

The map shows the projected regional impacts of Israeli settlements, the Wall, and the proposed road infrastructure.

**MAP 7:**
Projected Regional Impacts of Israeli Settlements, the Wall, and the Proposed Road Infrastructure

**MAP 8:**
Projected National Impacts of Israeli Settlements, the Wall, and the Proposed Road Infrastructure

**BOX 6:**

- As of Oct. 2004, the length of the barrier was over 200 km (once completed it will be 832 km) and some 8,000 acres of land have been confiscated for its construction.
- Some 6.1% of the West Bank area will be west of the Wall (increasing to 8.2% when the wall will be built around the Ariel Bloc).
- When completed according to the present plans, only 6% of the wall will be within 100 meters of the Green Line.
- Once competed, 47.6% of West Bank land will have been de facto annexed into Israel.
- Some 9.7% of the Palestinian West Bank population is separated from cultivated lands by the wall, growing to 12.8% upon construction of wall sections around the Ariel Bloc. Another 9.2% of the population is isolated outside the walled areas.
- Once competed, 88.6% of settlers will live outside the Wall, while 89.5% of the Palestinian West Bank population will be trapped inside it. 10.5% will find itself isolated between the Wall and the Green Line, and 13.8% will be separated from their land by the Wall.

**AT A GLANCE: ISRAEL’S WALL**

- As of Oct. 2004, the length of the barrier was over 200 km (once completed it will be 832 km) and some 8,000 acres of land have been confiscated for its construction.
- Some 6.1% of the West Bank area will be west of the Wall (increasing to 8.2% when the wall will be built around the Ariel Bloc).
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- Once competed, 47.6% of West Bank land will have been de facto annexed into Israel.
- Some 9.7% of the Palestinian West Bank population is separated from cultivated lands by the wall, growing to 12.8% upon construction of wall sections around the Ariel Bloc. Another 9.2% of the population is isolated outside the walled areas.
- Once competed, 88.6% of settlers will live outside the Wall, while 89.5% of the Palestinian West Bank population will be trapped inside it. 10.5% will find itself isolated between the Wall and the Green Line, and 13.8% will be separated from their land by the Wall.
Recommended Research Sources:

- http://www.fmep.org/
- http://www.stopthewall.org/ (Palestinian campaign against the wall)
- http://www.reliefweb.int/hc-op/
- http://www.pengon.org/
- http://www.gush-shalom.org/Boycott/boyceng.htm (list of products from settlements)


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Research, graphs & layout: PASSIA
Maps & analysis: Jan de Jong

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Kindly supported by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), Jerusalem