ON NEGOTIATIONS

October 30-November 1 1991: Madrid peace conference: The US and the USSR co-host a three-day conference in Spain to set the framework to negotiate peace between Israel and Jordan, Syria Lebanon, and the Palestinian, marking the first time that direct and open peace talks are held between Israel and these four partners since 1949. The meeting results in bilateral talks between Israel and each of its neighbors, as well as multilateral talks about issues such as trade, refugees, water, arms control, environment and development. Ultimately, however, no agreements developed from the Madrid process.

January 1993, 21-23: Oslo Channel: A 1st round of secret Israel-PLO talks in begin in Sarpsborg, Norway. Several other around follow in the next months, while "officials" negotiations continue in the US as are multilateral talks in Moscow, Tunis, Rabat, Amman and other places. The Oslo Channel was envisaged by Norwegians as the back channel to the public Washington negotiations, with the aim to build confidence and respect and perhaps suggest some solution that could be implemented through the public channel.

The Oslo Accord: The Oslo negotiation tried to tackle the missing elements of all previous talks- a direct agreement between Israel and Palestinians/PLO. Its importance was the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. Oslo was only partially implemented. While the accords spoke of putting "an end to decades of confrontations and conflict" and of each side recognition "their mutual and political rights", there was no explicit statement that a state of Palestine would one day be set up alongside Israel.

September 13, 1993, Washington, DC: Declaration of Principle on interim Self-Government Arrangement (DoP): Resulting from the Oslo channel, the DoP, signed by Israel prime Minister YitzhaK Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in Washington, stipulated that further negotiations would be conducted in two phases: a first 'translation' or 'interim' period during which time Palestinian would held elections and Israel would gradually withdrew from areas in the west Bank and Gaza strip as well as transfer certain power to the Palestinians in return for Palestinian guarantees, particularly related to security, and a second phase to conclude a 'final statue' agreement' based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.

The 1993 Declaration of Principle on Interim Self-government Arrangement: The DoP postponed main and difficult issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlement, water, Security, and the borders. By the target date (4 May 1999), however, a permanent settlement was far from being reached. Instead, a series of new agreements had been signed, including: the Agreement on Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Oslo I, 4May 1994), the Palestinian -Israeli interim Agreement on the west bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II, 28Sep/1995), the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron(Jan, 1997), the Wye River Memorandum (Oct. 1998) and the sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum (Oct, 1998). The DoP was preceded by an exchange of letters in which Arafat pledged that the PLO recognized Israel and committed itself to peace, while Rabin stated that Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

September 14, 1993, Washington, DC: Israel-Jordan Common Agenda: Resulting from the bilateral talks that were set off at the 1991 Madrid Conference, Israel and Jordan signed the Common Agenda,
consulting the blueprint for the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. The Agenda comprised of the following components: security, water, refugees and displaced persons, borders, and territorial matters.

**May 4, 1994: Gaza-Jericho Agreement** (also known as the Oslo I or Cairo Agreement): Israel and the Palestinian agreed on a first stage of Palestinian autonomy - in Gaza and Jericho- including Israeli redeployment (excluding Jewish settlement and their environs) and the establishment of a palestinian self-government authority. Israel remains in control of the settlement, military locations, and security matters. The stipulated interim period ended on 4 May 1999 and trigged a heated debate among the palestinians as to whether to declare unilaterally a Palestinian state.

**July 1, 1994**: After years in exile, PLO Chairman Arafat makes a triumphal return to Palestine, entering Gaza to take up his position as ra'ees of the new Palestinian self-rule authority.

**August 29, 1994: Erez: Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities** (Early Empowerment Agreement) Agreement signed by Israel and the Palestinians to put into effect the next phase (early empowerment) of the Declaration of Principles. providing for the transfer of powers to the Palestinian Authority within five spheres: (1) Education & Culture (carried out on 29 August 1994); (2) Social Welfare (13-14 November 1994); (3) Tourism (13-14 November 1994); (4) Health (1 December 1994); Taxation (1 December 1994). About a year later, on 27 August 1995, another protocol was signed transferring additional spheres to the PA (Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities)

**July 25, 1994, Washington Declaration**: King Hussein of Jordan and Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin officially end the state of war between their own countries, agreeing to follow UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 to seek a total and lasting peace and advance their economic cooperation. Israel further acknowledge Jordan's special role in the oversight of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem with regard to the final status of Jerusalem.

**October 26, 1994, Wadi 'Araba Border Crossing: Israel Jordan Peace Treaty**: Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Jordanian Prime Minister Abdul-Salam Majali sign a peace treaty formally normalizing all relations between the two nations. The treaty normalized relations between the two countries, resolved territorial disputes between them (resorting some 380 km2 of occupied lands to Jordan, guaranteeing it an equal share of water from the Yarmouk and Jordan's rivers, and defining its western borders conclusively), and provided a solid framework for bilateral cooperation in the political, economic and cultural fields. As a result of this treaty, Jordan became the second Arab country (after Egypt) to sign a peace agreement with Israel. Diplomatic relations began on 27 Nov. 1994.

**September 28, 1995, Washington, DC: Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip** (also known as the Oslo II or Taba Agreement): Israel and the Palestinians greed in Taba to expand Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza and allow Palestinian elections (held on 20 January 1996). Palestinian autonomy was extended to other parts of the West Bank, which was divided into Area A (full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security), Area B (full Palestinian civil
Jurisdiction joint Israeli- Palestinian internal security), and Area C (Israeli Civil and overall security control). October 1997 was the target date for the completion of further redeployment and October 1999 for reaching final status Agreement.

October 1995-end of 1996: On 4 November 1995, prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, an orthodox Jewish student opposed to Israeli withdrawals from the occupied west bank. Shimon Peres took over and decided to go all-out for peace deal with Syria, in contrast to earlier cautious negotiations. While considerable progress was made in meeting at the secluded Wye Plantation, talks eventually collapsed. Palestinian elections took place on 20 January 1996 resulting in Fateh-dominated, 88 -member legislative council and PLO chairman Arafat as president. In the May 1996 Israeli elections Peres lost to Binyamin Netanyahu, who campaigned with the slogan 'Peace with security' against the rabin-peres program. In 1996, a few steering committee meetings in the multilateral talks took place but were then halted due to a general stalemate in the peace process.

January 17, 1997: Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (Hebron Agreement): Accord signed by Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, in which Israel agreed to withdraw from80% of the city (H1), while retaining control over an enclave with 450 settler and 35000 Palestinian in the city's center (20%,H2), which includes the Old City, Ibrahim Mosque, and seven settlements.

October 23, 1998 Wye River Memorandum: US president Clinton hosted Prime Minister Netanyahu and president Arafat to negotiate- after US pressure to end 18 months of stagnation on the Peace track- the details of implementation of Oslo II and the resumption of final status talks. The memorandum divided the 2nd redeployment provided by Oslo II, which was to be completed in April 1997, into three phases totaling 13% of the west bank. Other main point were changes in the PLO Charter, opening the Gaza airport and the safe passage corridor, reducing the number of Palestinian police, and releasing Palestinian prisoners. Subsequently, Israeli withdrew from 2% of the west bank near Jenin, the Gaza airport was opened, and some detainees were released. The Netanyahu coalition was collapsed over implementation of the Wye deal and in December 1998the Knessat voted for early elections in May 1999, which suspended further implementation of the of the agreement. In the elections Netanyahu was defeated by labor party leader Ehud Barak. The Wye River Agreement did not include an official map detailing the area to be transferred by Israel to PA control, and there were only informal insurance that the transfer of land out of Area C would take place primaly in the northern west bank (first redeployment), Ramallah Area second, and Hebron (third).

September 4 1999 Sharm Esh -Sheikh Memorandum: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat- witnessed by US secretary of state Albright, Egyptian president Mubarak, and King Abdullah II of Jordan- agree for the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. The agreement stipulated that Israel would withdrew in three stages from another 11% of West Bank land, release some 350 Palestinians political prisoners, open the safe passage from Gaza and the West Bank, and begin permanent status talks on 13 September 1999 to reach a framework for a settlement of the conflict by February 2000 and a final peace agreement by September 2000. However, Like the Wye Accord, no official map detailing the areas to be transferred by Israel was produced.
November 8, 1999: The Israeli and the PLO/PA negotiation team s- headed by Oded Eran and yasser Abed Rabbo - met at Grand park hotel in Ramallah to start the final status aimed at forging a final peace agreement by September 2000.

February-May 2000: On 3 February 2000, a summit between Israeli Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat broke up over disagreement on a promised Israeli withdrawal from the west bank under the revised Wye accord. Ten days later, final statues negotiations between Israeli and the Palestinians were deadlocked as the deadline for a framework agreement was missed. On 21 March, Israel finally handed over west bank territory to the Palestinians amounting to 6.1% of the total- a last part of a transfer originally agreed at Wye River in 1998. Palestinians and Israeli negotiations led by Yasser Abd Rabo and Oded Eran also met at the boling Air Force Base near Washington to restart final status talks and reach a permanent agreement by 13 September 2000, but the talks ended without the hoped - for breakthrough.

July 11-25, 2000: Camp David Summit: In July 2000, the US called for a three-way summit with the intention of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on final status issues within the schedule set by the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. However, the Camp David summit – Israeli and Palestinian delegations headed by Barack and Arafat as well as American mediators – ended on 26 July 20000, after 15 days of talks that were more detailed than ever before, without success. Palestinians and Israeli accused each other of intransigence, but issued a trilateral statement promising to continue working towards a permanent peace agreement and delineating the principles of future talks.

The basic problem at Camp David was that Israel’s offer – the Gaza Strip, parts of the West Bank, plus extra land from the Negev desert, while keeping major settlement blocks and most of East Jerusalem, Islamic guardianship of key sites in the old city of Jerusalem and contributions to a fund for Palestinian refugees – was far less than the minimum the Palestinians could accept. The Palestinians, in turn, wanted to start a reversion to the lines of 1967, offered the Israelis rights over the Jewish quarter of the Old City and insisted on the recognition of the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees.

October 16-17, 2000, Sharm Esh-Sheikh: Sharm Esh-Sheikh Summit/Talks: Against the background of the failure of the peace process, a controversial visit by opposition leader Ariel Sharon on 28 September 2000 to Haram Ash-Sharif compound sparked off a spiral of violence and unrest (Al-Aqsa Intifada). US President Clinton called for and presided over a summit, attended by president Arafat, Prime Minister Barack, President Clinton, the UN’s Kofi Annan, the EU’s Javier Solana, King Abdullah, and President Mubarak, to find ways to halt the violence, set up an inquiry into its causes, and explore the possibilities concerning the restoration of security cooperation as well as a return to peace negotiations. As part of the agreement reached at the close of the talks, the Mitchell Commission was established to investigate the events leading to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, how to prevent their recurrence, and how to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations.

November-December 2000: US ‘Bridging Proposal’ and the ‘Clinton Parameters’: To overcome the post-Camp David deadlock, the US came with yet another bridging proposal in November 2000: Israeli withdrawal from 90% of the West Bank to make way for a Palestinian state, and several solutions for the problems of settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem at a trilateral meeting in the White House on 23 December 2000, US President Clinton, who hoped to conclude a comprehensive agreement before the
end of his term in office, presented his parameters for final accelerated talks to Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. The parameters, accepted by both Prime Minister Barack and president Arafat with reservations at the basis for further talks, fell short of the international legal standard for ending Israel’s occupation and recognizing the rights of Palestinian refugees. Clinton officially outlined the parameters which served as the basis for the Taba talks, in a speech to the Israeli Policy Forum on 7 January 2001 in New York.

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**The ‘Clinton Parameters’, 7 January 2001:**

- Establishment of a non-militarized “sovereign, viable Palestinian state that would accommodate Israel’s security requirements and the demographic realities” in most of the WBGS with few land swaps;
- A solution for the refugees that would allow them to return to a Palestinian state, resettlement in their current locations, or in third countries, as well as compensation for the international community for their losses and assistance in building their new lives;
- An international presence to provide border security and monitor implementation of the final agreement;
- “Fair and logical propositions” regarding Jerusalem to remain an open and undivided city with assured freedom of access and worship for all and incorporation of the principle ‘what is Arab should be Palestinian’ and ‘what is Jewish should be Israeli’;
- An official end to the conflict.

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**January 22-27, 2001: Taba Conference:** Based on the Clinton Parameters, and to follow-up on ideas of the Camp David Summit, Israelis and Palestinians conducted talks in January 2001 in Taba, but given the circumstances and time constraints (Intifada, Israeli elections) they failed to come to an agreement though differences were narrowed. There was more flexibility on territory and Israeli negotiators reportedly accepted the concept of East Jerusalem being the capital of a Palestinian state. Nevertheless, the conference ended again in a standstill, but the parties issued a Joint Statement asserting that they have never before been so close to an agreement and expressing hope for the future. With his governing coalition teetering on the edge of collapse, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak resigned in December 2000, saying he wanted a new mandate form the Israeli people. However, subsequent elections in February 2001 brought to power Likud’s Ariel Sharon, effectively ending the peace process.

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**February-March 2002, Saudi (Arab Peace Plan):** In February 2002, the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah announced his proposal of “normal relations” with Israel for a full withdrawal of Israeli troops from the OPT, recognition of a Palestinian state and the refugees’ right to return. After the failure of bilateral talks and the resumption of the conflict, the Saudi initiative was presented at an Arab summit in Beirut on 28 March 2002 and adopted by the Arab League. The plan went back to a multilateral approach and somewhat indicated a desire by the Arab world as a whole to put an end to this dispute. It called for Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, supported the right of return and a “just solution” for all Palestinian refugees and their descendents; and the creation of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. In return, Arab countries would consider the Arab-Israeli conflict to be over and normalize relations with Israel. The strength of the plan, which was re-endorsed by another Arab summit in Riyadh
in 2007, is the Arab countries’ support for a two-state solution, but it is also weak in as far as the parties have yet to negotiate the same issues on which they have failed so far.

**June 24, 2002: Bush’s Vision for the Middle East:** In a Rose Garden Speech, President George W. Bush outlined a new peace plan, with the possibility of a sovereign Palestinian state established in the near future, making him the first US president to call for a Palestinian state. The plan called for a new Palestinian leadership and a reformed democratic Palestinian government and for a cessation of all activities supporting or tolerating terrorism. The plan focuses mainly on the impediments to the peace process posed by the Palestinians since the Israelis has repeatedly offered and acted upon various concessions for peace, and on greater democratization throughout the Arab world.

**December 2002-June 2003: Road Map:** The so-called Middle East Quartet – the US, the UN, the EU and Russia – presented a new draft peace plan to Israel and the Palestinians, based upon President Bush’s speech of June 24, 2002 and principles of the Oslo Accords. The plan – was formally launched in April 2003 after the Palestinian parliament endorsed the new cabinet and Mahmoud Abbas was sworn in as first Palestinian Prime Minister. It aimed at a “final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005,” based on a full two-state solution, starting with an end to Palestinian terrorism and a freeze on Israeli settlements and other steps to normalize conditions, though it had no timetable. At a three-way summit held in Aqaba, Jordan, on 4 June 2003, attended by US President Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon promised withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian areas, and Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas pledged an end to the Intifada. However, due to ongoing violence, the Israeli Cabinet decided on 1 September 2003 to wage war against militants and halted the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority until it proves it is taking concrete measures to stop terrorism.

The Road Map (in full: Performance-based and Goal-driven Road Map’) has not been implemented. Its phased timetable, which called for the final agreement to be reached in 2005, has been overtaken by events. However, the Road Map, which charts progress toward a final-status agreement through a series of benchmarks relating to security and has monitoring groups under the auspices of the Quartet, is still the official blueprint towards peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The Quartet meets intermittently to track the progress of the plan, which, however, has been little to date.

**December 2003-September 2005: Israeli Unilateral Disengagement:** At the Fourth Herzliya Conference on 18 December 2003, Prime Minister Sharon presented a plan for Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank, ending effectively the era of talks and attempts to negotiate a solution. On 6 June 2004, the Israeli Cabinet passed a revised version of the plan, on 25 October the Knesset approved it. In February 2005 Sharon met with President Abbas, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah of Jordan in Sharm el-Sheikh to announce the implementation of Israel’s planned disengagement, which was enacted in August 2005 through the removal of all Israeli settlements and military installations in the Gaza Strip and of four settlements in the northern West Bank. Disengagement from Gaza was completed on 12 Sept. 2005, from the West Bank 10 days later.

**2006-2009: Years of Political Deadlock, Diplomatic Impasse and Internal Standoff 2006:** On 25 January 2006, the second Palestinian elections brought to power Hamas, with 74 seats to the ruling Fateh’s 45.
On 19 February, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh formed a new government. With the coming to power of Hamas in March 2006, Israel suspended all remaining contacts with the PA, and on 7 April the US and the EU formally cut off all direct aid to the new government, demanding that Hamas recognize Israel, honor previous PA agreements, renounce violence, and disarm its commandos. On 13 April, Ehud Olmert officially assumed the post of Israeli Prime Minister, replacing Sharon who has suffered a stroke earlier the year. On 25 May, the Palestinian national dialogue began among senior Fateh and Hamas leaders. A month later, both groups adopted the so-called Prisoners’ Document, which called for the creation of a Palestinian state within pre-1967 borders alongside Israel, and asserted the right of Palestinian refugees to return to lands with Israel proper.

2007: On 28 March 2007, the Arab League Summit at Riyadh, re-endorsed the Arab Initiative, revised since its conception in 2002. In early April, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert accepted the Initiative and invited the Arab heads of state to a meeting in Israel. On 25 June, Prime Minister Olmert, President Abbas, President Mubarak, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II met in Sharm Esh-Sheikh to discuss containment of Hamas in Gaza and to strengthen Abbas’ Fateh party in the westbank. Subsequently, meetings between Abbas and Olmert (known as the “four eyes”) resumed. After the near civil war, during which Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the National Unity Government was dissolved and on 19 September, Israel’s Security Cabinet voted to declare the Gaza Strip an “enemy entity”. On 27 November, a US-sponsored peace conference took place in Annapolis with Israeli and PLO leaders agreeing on a joint understanding to restart final status negotiations. The meeting was attended by representatives of over 30 nations, the UNSC and the Quartet, and resulted in a draft resolution being presented by the US to the UNSC, which was, however, immediately withdrawn after Israeli objections. The heads of the Annapolis delegations agreed to meet continuously starting December 12, and expressed hope to reach a final peace agreement by the end of 2008.

2008: During January 2008, President Bush embarked on a tour of a number of Middle East countries, starting with Israel, in a bid to advance peace negotiations initiated at the Annapolis conference in November 2007. He urged the Palestinians to dismantle the “terrorist” infrastructure and Israel to halt settlement construction. In March 2008, Arab heads of state renewed their 2002 Arab Peace Initiative in a meeting in Damascus and asked for a review in the light of ongoing negotiations. Addressing that summit, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reiterated his commitment to “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace, the end of occupation, and the establishment of a Palestinians State which will side by side in peace and security with Israel” whilst calling for a “different and more positive strategy for Gaza.” However, any hopes for progress were destroyed when Israel launched a massive military assault against Palestinian militants in Gaza on 27 December.

2009: In protest to Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s three-week offensive in Gaza, which left 1,400 Palestinians dead, the PA halted peace talks with the Jewish state. On January 20, newly elected US president Barack Obama took office and made the Mideast peace process one of his top priorities. He named George Mitchell as Middle East envoy and has sent him since on frequent visit to the region. In Israel, elections in March brought Binyamin Netanyahu back to power, heading a right-wing coalition. In June 2009, Obama delivered a landmark speech, reiterating his support for the two-state principle on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his call upon the Jewish state to end settlement expansion, and Prime Minister Netanyahu presented his vision of peace with the Palestinians, saying a Palestinian state should be created but under conditions to protect Israel’s security and based on the principles of recognition.
and demilitarization. In September, President Obama brought Abbas and Netanyahu together for a handshake at the UN, disappointing Palestinian hopes he would keep backing their demand for settlement freeze before new talks. In November, Netanyahu announced a partial, 10-month halt on building permits in West Bank settlements, and Abbas – under US pressure – agreed to return to negotiations. Throughout the year, various bilateral and multilateral measures have been implemented by the PA, Israel, and the international community in order to strengthen and develop the Palestinian economy.

2010: On 3 March, the Arab League endorsed four months of “proximity talks”, a formula that allowed President Abbas to resume some form of negotiations without his demands on settlements being met. Hamas condemned the move. Five days later, US Middle East envoy George Mitchell issues a statement, saying: “I’m pleased that the Israeli and Palestinian leadership have accepted indirect talks…. As we’ve said many times, we hope that these will lead to direct negotiations as soon as possible…”

2010: On 20 August, the US government announced that direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would resume after a September 2 launch ceremony at the White House. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that these negotiations should be “without preconditions.” According to the parties – US Pres. Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu, Pres. Abbas, Pres. Mubarak and King Abdullah – the framework for talks was laid down during four days of meetings, including the discussion of final status issues (borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, water and security), with a timeframe of 12 months (though such a “deadline” seems somewhat ridiculous, considering the fact that 17 years have passed since the Declaration of Principles, with its five-year deadline for reaching a permanent status agreement, was signed.)

After regional meetings between the parties, all congregated in Sharm Esh-Sheikh for a summit on 14 September to continue direct negotiations, which are then supposed to continue between Netanyahu and Abbas in Jerusalem, however, the continuation of the process heavily depends on the extension of the Israeli moratorium on settlement activity.

“The US believes that no party should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine issues that can only be reached through negotiations. In this regard, the US has opposed, and will continue to oppose, settlement activity in territories occupied in 1967, which remains an obstacle to peace.”

US Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians of 18 October 1991

“If anyone wants to kill this peace process he can do it on the issue of Jerusalem.”

Faisal Husseini, July 1994

“After this secret romance in Oslo we came out barren. They gave us a homeland smaller than a single grain of wheat, a homeland to swallow without water, like aspirin pills.

Oh, we dreamed of a great peace and a white crescent and a blue sea. Now we find ourselves on a dung-heap.”

Poem by Nizar Qabbani; Published in the daily al-Hayat, London 1995.
“As a poet I am constitutionally of the party of peace, for poetry cannot be written in the shadow of death and desolation. But what we are offered here [i.e., the Oslo Accords] is not peace but a pacifier made of rubber with not milk in it, a bottle of wine with no bottom, a love letter written in invisible ink. What we are offered takes from us what is above us and what is under our feet, and leaves us on a mat… Nothing remains for us of Palestine in the shadow of this ruinous peace.”

Nizar Qabbani in response to Egyptian writer Naguib Mahfouz, who had criticized the “political weakness” of his poem “al-Muharwiluun’, 1995.

“There is no big difference between the peace mentality and the war mentality. Peace needs two sides while war can be decided by one party, as in case of the present Israeli government … We view the Israeli plans to build new settlements and open up new settlement roads as a ‘declaration of war.’”


“Logic tells me the two sides, he Palestinians and us...are approaching a moment where we will have no choice but to do something. Otherwise, there will truly be a blowup. What sort of blowup I am not willing to say.”

Israeli President Ezer Weizman, 26 July 1998

“This is your problem but I warn you that every line in the Oslo Accord calls for another accord ... The Oslo Accord is very mysterious and when a document is mysterious, it usually is in favor of the stronger party.”


“How do you spell apartheid? O-s-l-o.”

Edward Said, headline of an article, Al-Ahram weekly 11 Oct. 1998

“Palestinian unilateralism tends to the rhetorical, Israeli to be the real.”

Washing Post Editorial, 24 March 1999, commenting on Israel’s complain about the possible Palestinian ‘unilateral’ action, of declaring a state.

“We signed the Oslo Agreement on the basis of 242. We signed the Sharm Agreement on the basis of 242. We now signed the new Oslo Declaration on the basis of 242.”

Pres. Yasser Arafat responding to a statement by Barak on why UN Res. 242 is not applicable to the final status negotiations, 8-9 Nov. 1999.

“Following the signing of the Oslo Accords...I said three things: First, following a long period of “pregnancy” we brought a child into the world [the Oslo Accords] who is smaller, weaker, and uglier than what we had hoped for. However, despite it all, this is still our child, and we must nurture, strengthen and develop it so that he is able to stand on his own two feet. Second, we are the Jews of the
21st Century. Meaning, we the Palestinians will be the Jews of the early [previous] century. They infiltrated our country using various methods; using all kinds of passports, and they suffered greatly in the process. They even had to face humiliation but they did it all for one goal: To enter our country and root themselves in it prior to our expulsion out of it. We must act in the same way they did. [We must] return [to the land], settle it, and develop new roots in our land from where we were expelled; whatever the price may be. Third, the [ancient] Greek army was unable to break into Troy due to [internal] disputes and disagreements [among themselves]. The Greek forces started retreating one after the other, and the Greek king ended up facing the walls of Troy all by himself, and he too suffered from illnesses and [internal] disputes, and ended up leading a failed assault on Troy’s walls. [Following these events] the people of Troy climbed on top of the walls of their city and could not find any traces of the Greek army, except for a giant wooden horse. They cheered and celebrated thinking the Greek troops were routed, and while retreating, they left a harmless wooden horse as spoils of war. So they opened the gates of the city and brought in the wooden horse. We all know what happened next. Had the US and Israel not realized, before Oslo, that all that was left of the Palestinian national movement and the Pan-Arab movement was a wooden horse called Arafat or the PLO, they would never have opened their fortified gates and let it inside their walls."


“The mistake was not with the Oslo Accords, but the mistake was with these crazy leaders in Israel – like Netanyahu and Barak – who didn’t implement the agreements. I believe that Oslo did open the door for peace in the Middle East, but unfortunately, the Israelis never implemented the agreements, so there is no real agreement now.”


“We are asking for full Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem occupied in 1967” ...

“Do you want to come to my funeral!? I would rather die than agree to Israeli sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif.”


“The Palestinian leader who will give up Jerusalem has not been born. I will not betray my people or the trust they have placed in me. Don’t look at me to legitimize the occupation! Of course, it can continue longer, but it can’t last forever. No one can continue indefinitely to impose domination by military force – look at South Africa! ... Our people will not accept less than their rights as stated by international resolutions and international legality.”


“Israel makes a grave mistake if it thought that the peace process can move forward while it ignored the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to return and to establish an independent state on its own land .... Israel would be making an even greater mistake if it imagined that the Arab and Islamic world would remain silent towards the unilateral steps it is taking in Jerusalem.”

"The lack of Israeli security is born of the lack of Palestinian freedom. Israel will have security only after the end of the occupation, not before. Once Israel and the rest of the world understand this fundamental truth, the way forward becomes clear: End the occupation, allow the Palestinians to live in freedom and let the independent and equal neighbors of Israel and Palestine negotiate a peaceful future with close economic and cultural ties.”


“Israel proposed in Taba physically to dismantle, or hand over to the Palestinians for the use of returning refugees, more than one hundred settlements. But those that formed coherent blocs against adjacent to the 1967 lines were supposed to remain as such under Israel’s sovereignty.


“Some progress was presumably made in the working group (at Taba) on refugees mainly on a preamble that would describe an agreed narrative on the origin of the refugee problem, a component of moral compensation that was always deemed to be vital for a settlement. But no agreement was reached about the narrative, nor was any headway made on two other vital questions.” …. “ONLY two questions remained opened for further discussion ... There were the number of refugees that would be admitted to Israel and whether or not Israel would endorse the ‘principle’ or the right of return.”


“If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses, and we face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights ... then, as soon as that happens, the State of Israel is finished.”

Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert the day after the Annapolis peace conference, November 2007.

“We are hoping that talks will succeed but we are all very pessimistic about the viability of the peace process because of past experience.”

Arab League chief Amr Musa, 29 Aug. 2010, interview on the sidelines of a political conference in Slovenia.

Jerusalem

Palestinian Position:
- Palestinians have legal, religious, and historical connections and rights regarding Jerusalem, which is of political, geographic, and spiritual strategic importance to them.
- As part of the territory occupied in 1967, East Jerusalem is subject to UN Security Council 242. It is part of the territory over which the Palestinians state shall exercise sovereignty upon its establishment.
As stated in the 1993 Declaration of Principles, the whole of Jerusalem (and not merely East Jerusalem) is the subject of permanent status negotiations, which will result in a Palestinian state exercising sovereignty over part of the territory. This will serve as a capital of the State of Palestine.

An acceptable agreement on Jerusalem is a necessary condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Jerusalem should be an open city with no physical partition that would prevent free movement.

Freedom of worship and access to site of religious significance must be guaranteed to all and their dignity protected and preserved.

**Israeli Position:**

- Jerusalem is and will remain the capital of the State of Israel, undivided, under exclusive Israeli sovereignty.

- There is no basis in international law for the position supporting a status of corpus separatum for the city of Jerusalem, which was no more than a non-binding proposal and became irrelevant with the Arab states’ rejection of UN Resolution 181.

- Netanyahu has shown no willingness, as Olmert did, that he would be ready to cede Arab neighborhoods to the Palestinians for their future capital, not to share sovereignty over the Haram Ash-Sharif or the so-called “Holy Basin.”

**Borders**

**Palestinian Position:**

- The starting point for a discussion on borders must be the June 4, 1967 lines (i.e., the 1949 Armistice Lines) which mutually agreed upon adjustments (land swaps).

- Full control over the borders (free movement and access to international markets) and a territorial link between the West Bank and Gaza.

- A recent PLO Negotiation Department document states that the Palestinians will try to secure a UN Security Council resolution to this end, with East Jerusalem mentioned as a capital. With regard to land swaps: these should not cover more than 1-4% of the Palestinian territories.

**Palestinian Position:**

- Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has consistently refused to acknowledge the 1967 lines as starting point for talks on borders, claiming these lines would not allow Israel to have defensible borders – for him a prerequisite. He rather insists that UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 – calling on Israel to withdraw its army from territories occupied in the course of the war in 1967 – does not require a full withdrawal to the 1967 borders.

- Israel’s adamant refusal to dismantle West Bank settlements makes an agreement on borders virtually impossible.

- A land-swap compromise would encompass up to 10% of the occupied land.
Security

Palestinian Position:
- Security, stability, and peace in the region would not be attained unless the Israel occupation of all Arab and Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 comes to an end.
- It is impossible to discuss security before establishing the borders of the Palestinian state.
- A Palestinian state must be able to defend against outside threats.
- Airspace could be controlled jointly.
- A recent PLO Negotiation Department document suggests an interest-based model of cooperation, taking into account that the US deploys over 230,000 troops in the Middle East, should be adopted by all.

Israeli Position:
- Israel’s security is above everything.
- Complete Israeli control of the airspace above the West Bank and Gaza.
- In a 2009 speech at Bar-Ilan University, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu accepted publicly the idea of a two-state solution, but insisting that any future Palestinian state must be demilitarized. (“We must ensure that Palestinians will not be able to import missiles into their territory, to field an army, to close their airspace to us, or to make pacts with the likes of Hezbollah and Iran.”)
- He has also repeatedly stressed that Israel must have a presence on the eastern border of a future Palestinian state, to prevent weapons smuggling.

Refugees

Palestinian Position:
- Recognition of the refugee rights (including right to return) will open the way to negotiating their implementation, which must include the basic principles of voluntary repatriation, or resettlement, restitution and compensation for material and non-material losses.
- Israel must acknowledge responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem.
- The issue must be resolved in a just manner, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 or 11 December 1948, which states:

Israeli Position:
- Any fiscal accord would require the Palestinians to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people, thus implicitly keeping out the “right of return” to Palestinian refugees.
- Palestinian refugees who want to return would have to be absorbed in a future Palestinian state, just as Israel has over the years absorbed millions of Jewish immigrants. The refugees’ return to what is now Israel proper would threaten the Jewish identity of Israel.
- Unlike his predecessor Ehud Olmert in talks with President Abbas in 2008, Netanyahu has not made any statements as to whether a limited number of Palestinian refugees would be accepted into Israel proper as a “humanitarian gesture”.

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**Settlements**

**Palestinian Position:**
- All the settlements that were built after 1967 are illegal and should be evacuated to make a state viable.
- An immediate genuine and comprehensive settlement freeze and dismantling of outposts are necessary.
- Most recently, President Abbas informed the Obama administration that the talks would reach a dead end if Israel resumed settlement activities, partially frozen earlier this year.

**Israeli Position:**
- West Bank land and settlements need to be retained as a buffer in case of future aggression.
- Unlike previous governments, which stated that settlements in the territories that will become a Palestinian state would need to be removed, Netanyahu has not talked about the need to uproot settlements. Some key members in his inner circle even believe that in an agreement, Jews should be able to live in a future Palestinian state, just as there is an Arab minority in the Jewish one.
- Netanyahu has further pledged to keep several major settlement blocs in any peace deal, without mentioning the possibility of compensation through land swaps.

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**Water**

**Palestinian Position:**
- Acceptance of the principle of international water law stipulating that both Israel and Palestine are entitled to an equitable and reasonable allocation of shared freshwater resources.
- Compensation by Israel for the past and ongoing illegal use of Palestinian water resources.

**Israeli Position:**
- Any additional water for Palestinians must not come out of the Israeli share of water removed from the West Bank ever since the 1967.